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ABSTRACT
This study compares environmental policy in the United States and 
Japan through an analysis of the Clean Air Acts in both countries. As the U.S. 
and Japan are both constitutional democracies with similar economic goals, 
and the environmental policies of the U.S. and Japan are very similar, the 
difference in the implementation of environmental regulations is compared by 
analyzing the separate relationships between business and government in 
each country. The paper examines the Clean Air Acts of 1970 in both Japan 
and the U.S, and compares the success of this legislation in terms of industrial 
compliance and emissions reduction. The examination suggests that Japan has 
been more successful in its implementation of environmental regulations due to 
the Japanese bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws 
and direct their implementation in a cooperative effort with industry. Alternately, 
environmental policy making and its implementation in the U.S. is characterized 
by an adversarial relationship between business and government which is 
compounded by a political system that lacks the institutional strength to 
effectively implement environmental policies. The study suggests market based 
incentives as a means by which to approach environmental policy and achieve 
private sector compliance in the U.S.
vi
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
IN T R O D U C T IO N
G O V E R N M E N T - IN D U STR Y R E LA TIO N S  AND E N VIR O N M EN TA L  
POLICY: TH E UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Over the past two decades environmental regulation has become a 
significant factor affecting industrial policy. In every industrialized nation 
businesses have had to confront an increase in environmental standards in all 
levels of production.1 Whether business activities involve the extraction or use 
of natural resources, processing operations, manufacture of final products, the 
packaging and sale of consumer and industrial goods, or the eventual disposal 
of goods and wastes, they are no longer conducted without some attention to 
environmental consequences.2
The United States and Japan provide an interesting comparison of 
environmental regulations and their implementation. Japan and the U.S. are 
both constitutional democracies which share similar democratic principles. The 
United States and Japan are also highly industrialized democracies with 
capitalist market economies and are both committed to economic growth as a 
national priority. Furthermore, during the early 1970's, both governments 
responded to public concern about environmental quality with similar 
administrative and legislative initiatives. In fact, only in Japan has the entire 
direction of environmental policy changed as rapidly over the past twenty years 
as it has in the United States.3
1 Rogene Buchholz, Alfred Marcus, James Post, Managing Environmental Issues: A Casebook. 
(Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) p.9.
2 Buchholz, p.9.
3 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United 
States. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986) p.21.
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3Although Japan and the U.S share similar political structures and 
environmental policies, the difference in their implementation of environmental 
regulations provides an interesting comparison. Put simply, Japan has been 
able to implement it's environmental regulations more successfully than the 
United States. Ironically, the American approach to environmental regulations 
is the most rigid and rule oriented to be found in any industrial society.4 The 
United States makes more extensive use of uniform standards for emissions 
and environmental quality than any other nation.5 Yet, while American 
regulations enacted since 1969 impose strict environmental standards on 
industry, these regulations have not been implemented as successfully in the 
United States as they have in Japan.
The most striking difference between the creation and implementation of 
environmental regulations in Japan and the U.S. is related to the separate 
relationships between industry and government in each country. The 
successful implementation of Japan’s environmental regulations can be 
attributed to the bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws 
and direct their implementation in a cooperative effort with industry. Alternately, 
environmental policy making and its implementation in the U.S. is characterized 
by an adversarial relationship between business and government which is 
compounded by a political system that lacks the institutional capacity to 
effectively implement policies.6 In sum, while it is difficult to make cross-national 
comparisons of policy effectiveness, it appears that Japan has been more 
successful in its implementation of environmental regulations due to the 
cooperative efforts of Japan's business and government. Consequently, Japan
4 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.21.
5 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.21.
6 David Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations In The United States: An Overview," in Stephen 
Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government - Industry Relations: Western Europe. 
The United States, and Japan. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) p.91.
4has been more successful in controlling and decreasing pollution.
As Tyson and Zysman state, there is more than one form of capitalism, 
more than one way of structuring business-state relations in a democratic 
society.7 This is made clear when comparing government-industry relations in 
the U.S. and Japan. America’s policy for industry rests on three central 
principles: market competition, price driven adjustment, and a government 
limited to regulatory functions (essentially guaranteeing corporate management 
freedom from outside interference, specifically government interference).8 
Zysman states that the arms-length political stance that the U.S. government 
takes towards business rests on three structural elements: (1) the apparatus of 
the government, which divides powers and makes the system responsive to 
particular interest group demands; (2) the court system, which reinforces the 
fragmentation of policy and the ability of small groups to influence or block the 
government; and (3) the financial system, which stands at arms-length from 
both government and business (a securities market-based financial system with 
internationally oriented major banks).9 In this system a thousand small battles 
must be won before any broad policy can be implemented and secured.10
The U.S. system is, by design, relatively weaker than other industrial 
countries. In the United States private groups are able to penetrate the political 
decision making process quite easily. The American government is so 
vulnerable to interest group pressures that the adoption and implementation of 
a coherent and consistent set of policies towards industry is next to
7 Laura Tyson, John Zysman, "Developmental Strategy And Production Innovation In Japan," in 
Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, John Zysman, eds., Politics and Productivity: The Real Storv of 
Whv Japan Works. (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988) p.60.
8 John Zysman, Governments. Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) p.266.
9 Zysman, p.262.
10 Zysman, p.268.
5impossible.11 In addition, the strength of private capital markets in the U.S. and 
the autonomy of America's financial institutions leave the government with few 
policy instruments through which to influence the economy or industrial policy.
In the American market-based financial system with internationally oriented 
major banks, the financial system constrains the government's capacity to 
intervene selectively in industry. In this situation the financial system is 
decentralized and power is diffused into the market.12 Furthermore, the 
separation of powers doctrine, at the core of the American constitution, creates 
three government branches that encompass distinctly different responsibilities, 
practices and powers. The result of these factors is a relatively weak American 
government and little cooperation between business and government.13 Both 
aspects stem from American political history, dating back to the Constitutional 
Convention and the Founding Fathers' fear of a powerful government, 
skepticism towards ties between government and any interest group (including 
business), and suspicion of government-business cooperation. As the founders 
intended to limit, not enhance, the powers of the state, the central feature of 
American politics is the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority.
The U.S. government's weak role in industry is a consequence of the 
political history of America's industrialization. Politics shaped the financial 
system in order to block the central government's domination of the economy 
and to prevent political domination of industry.14 Furthermore, America was 
also an early industrializer; economic change took place slowly and with
11 See Charles Schultze, "Industrial Policy: A Dissent," Brookings Review, Fall 1983; J.L. 
Badaracco, and D.B. Yoffie, "Industrial Policy: It Cant Happen Here," Harvard Business Review, 
Nov.-Dee. 1982.
12 Zysman, p.269.
13 Richard Boyd, "Government - Industry Relations in Japan: Access, Communication, and 
Competitive Collaboration," in Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government 
- Industry Relations: Western Europe. The United States, and Japan. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987) p.92.
14 Zysman, p.269.
6relatively little state direction.15 Compared to other capitalist nations America's 
industries grew with relatively little direct government assistance.16 David 
Vogel states that because the U.S. government played such a passive role in 
shaping industrial development, America's industrial elite developed an 
ideology that is highly critical of government intervention.17
In Japan both government policy making and business-government 
relations are generally cooperative in nature.18 There exists a series of 
linkages and points of access and communication between government and 
industry, the effect of which is to integrate the industrial policy community and 
facilitate the movement of ideas, the representation of interests and the 
formation and implementation of policy.19 Extensive use is made of these 
channels by both business and government. There is in fact a long tradition of 
close cooperation between government officials and the business community in 
Japan. As a late industrializer the Japanese state played a decisive role in 
building the economy of Japan. The pattern of state intervention established 
during the Meiji restoration of 1868 (during which building the economy was a 
primary goal) continues to the present day. Thus, a non-adversarial 
relationship between the public and private sector is inherent in the Japanese 
state. Furthermore, in Japan, the implementation of industrial policy is 
facilitated by a credit-based, industrial financial system which allocates 
resources through state influence and policies.20 This credit-based financial 
system provides a powerful policy instrument for the Japanese government.
15 Stephen Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of 
External Strength and Internall Weakness, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and 
Plenty: Foreign Economic Politics of Advanced Industrialized States. (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1978),p.62.
16 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
17 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
18 Haruhiro Fukui, "Studies in Policy Making: A Review of the Literature," in T.J... Pempel, ed., 
Policy Making in Contemporary Jaoan. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977) p.22-57.
19 Boyd, p.65.
20 Zysman, p.234.
7Following World War II Japan’s bureaucrats were able to manipulate 
credit, tax and trade, thereby building a strong economy and facilitating a shift 
from agriculture to industry. With these financial tools, the Japanese 
bureaucracy provided domestic producers with the support and guidance they 
needed to achieve competitive advantages in a global market.21 Many 
academics believe that the Japanese bureaucracy, especially The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), effectively planned and directed the 
transformation of the Japanese economy from its comparatively backward, war- 
torn condition in the late 1940's to its present status as an industrial giant.22 
Several features of Japanese political and historical experience lend credence 
to this thesis. Japan is considered a late-developing nation, industrializing later 
than much of Europe and North America. Late developing states, modern 
political economic theory suggests, tend to establish strong, intrusive 
bureaucracies, which deliberately put into place the economic infrastructure that 
emerged more or less spontaneously in nations that developed earlier.23 
Japan is nearly always classified as a "strong state," and the influence of late 
development on Japanese economic institutions has been the theme of many 
influential studies.24 In sum, it is generally accepted that most of the ideas for 
economic growth in the post WWII period came from the bureaucracy, and the 
business community responded to these ideas in a dependent manner. This 
tradition of business-government cooperation in Japan continues to remain in 
place to the present day.
In contrast to the United States, centralization is also found in Japan's 
private sector. Specifically, the separation of large and small firms is bridged in
21 David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in 
Japan. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.3.
22 Friedman, p.3.
23 Friedman, p.3.
24 Friedman, p.4.
8Japan, as a large proportion of small firms are subcontractors of larger 
corporations.25 Organizational unity is assured by an elaborate network of 
overlapping peak associations dominated by the larger corporations; this 
arrangement creates a large degree of centralization within the business 
community 26 Furthermore, inter-firm trade in Japan is dominated by long­
standing networks of reciprocal ties among companies. These networks are 
evident when they become formalized as identifiable Keiretsu, or industrial 
groupings 27 The Keiretsu provide for their members reliable sources of 
borrowed capital as well as a stable core of long-term shareholders. Moreover, 
they establish a particularly internalized market in intermediate products, 
particularly in trade in raw materials and industrial products 28 Within the 
Keiretsu, trade, finance, corporate control, and thus firms, become closely inter­
linked. These inter-firm groups or 'Keiretsu' linkages further integrate the 
industrial constituency and provide a flow of ideas in both directions: from and 
to key bureaucratic agencies. The bureaucratic penetration and control of these 
networks is substantial. In addition, the limited number of Japanese commercial 
banks are similarly centralized, as they are all directly tied to the Bank of Japan 
with its monopoly power to regulate the supply of credit29 Industrial policy in 
Japan is primarily formulated within a triangle consisting of government 
bureaucrats, major companies, and banks. Within this triangle formal and 
informal consultation is the norm, rather than the exception.
Although both the U.S. and Japan are highly industrialized market-based
25 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Politics of Advanced 
Industrialized States. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p.315.
26 Katzenstein, p.315.
27 Michael Gerlach, "Keiretsu Organization in the Japanese Economy: Analysis and Trade 
Implications, in Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, and John Zysman, eds., Politics and 
Productivity: The Real Storv of Why Japan Works. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1989), 
p .142.
28 Gerlach, p. 142.
29 Katzenstein, p.315.
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democracies that share similar economic goals, clearly the relationship 
between government and industry takes on a very separate character in each 
nation. While the firms in Japan consider government purposes in their 
strategies and inform and often negotiate with the government concerning their 
actions, this is not the case in the fragmented and separated U.S. system. As 
Peter Katzenstein states,
The lack of differentiation between state and society is a feature of the 
Japanese situation which facilitates policy implementation. In contrast 
to America, relations between business and the state are so symbiotic 
that it is virtually impossible to determine where one stops and the 
other begins. Multiple connections ex is t. . .  linking business, the LDP, 
and the state bureaucracy.30
In these distinctly separate arenas the implementation of similar environmental 
regulations takes on an extremely separate nature, and thus achieves different 
results. For the purpose of this study we will focus specifically on air pollution 
because air pollution has been the most salient environmental problem in the 
United States and Japan since 1970, and is similar in content in both 
countries.31
The differences between the Japanese and American regulatory policies 
are not confined to environmental regulation. Environmental policy can be 
used as a basis for generalizing about the politics and administration of 
government regulation in both countries 32 Thus, this study of national 
regulatory styles not only compares different approaches to environmental 
policy, but also provides a useful way of exploring the relationship between
t
business and government in both Japan and the United States.
30 Katzenstein, p.315.
31 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p. 151.
32 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.27.
C H A PTER  I
E N VIR O N M EN TA L PO LICY IN TH E  UNITED STATES: TH E  CLEAN
AIR ACT
In the United States widespread public concern for environmental 
conditions escalated during the 1960’s. In many ways the emerging 
environmental movement was a successor to the civil rights and anti-war 
movements of the 1960's. Prior to this decade, the common perception was that 
human activities could not impose permanent or substantial environmental 
damage, let alone present health problems.33 However, in the early 1960’s 
many environmental crises appeared and were publicly recognized: thick and 
harmful smog in several cities such as Los Angeles, the “death” of many lakes 
and rivers due to severe contamination, as well as publicized health problems 
specifically attributed to toxic wastes.34 Environmental pressure groups, aided 
by strong public support and substantial media attention, combined to exert 
considerable pressure on the government to enact significant environmental 
legislation. This “environmental movement” resulted in the enactment of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Under NEPA, Congress set 
forth comprehensive national environmental policy guidelines for the first time.
In the early 1970's many more environmental laws were enacted, such as The 
Clean Air Act, The Clean Water Act, and Superfund (designed to clean up toxic 
waste sites). Along with the introduction of environmental policies, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 to deal with
33 Charles Howe, "An Evaluation of United States Air and Water Policies," Environment, Sept. 
1991, p.11.
34 Howe, p.11.
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this new legislation.
The Clean Air Act of 1970 established extensive and stringent pollution 
regulations, and thus marked the beginning of the present era of pollution 
control policy.35 The six main points of the Clean Air act included:
1) Uniform national ambient air quality standards were to be set by the 
EPA to protect public health and welfare. These uniform standards 
applied to all U.S. states.36
2) Uniform national standards of performance for new industry were to 
be established.37
3) National emission standards for hazardous air pollutants were to be 
established by the EPA and would apply to existing as well as to new 
industrial plants. Arsenic, asbestos, benzene, beryllium, 
radionuclides, and vinyl chloride have all been designated as 
hazardous according to section 112 of the act.
4) Uniform restrictions on emissions from new motor vehicles were to be 
set.
5) Citizens were permitted to take legal action against any person, 
including the U.S. government and the EPA, alleged to be in violation 
of either emission standard.
6) A 30 million dollar research program was initiated to assess the 
causes and effects of noise pollution on public health and welfare.38 
The objective of this program was to reduce environmental noise to 
below a level at which there is a risk of hearing damage.
The Clean Air Act set a precedent for strong environmental legislation, and was 
intended to protect people and property from the hazardous effects of air 
pollution. However, the enactment of legislation is only a small part of the 
process towards achieving environmental clean up. Legislation must be 
applied effectively following its enactment: unfortunately, this was not the case 
in the United States. The Clean Air Act originally required the nation’s air to be 
clean by 1975. However, this proved impossible, as the Clean Air Act's 
standards and deadlines were substantially relaxed in a series of
35 Carolyn Adams, Hugh Heclo, Arnold Heidenheimer, Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of 
Social Choice in America. Europe, and Japan. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990) p. 166.
36 This act allowed states to set more stringent standards if they wished to do so.
37 The New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) have been diluted and often revised by the 
EPA since 1971.
38 The findings of this study resulted in the Noise Control Act of 1972.
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amendments.39
In an attempt to postpone the costs of installing controls, industry worked 
to postpone compliance dates set by the Clean Air Act.40 Although progress 
was made in reducing some pollutants, industry’s efforts resulted in holding 
deadlines more than anything else. Increasing pressure for the relaxation of 
strict deadlines and standards eventually resulted in the Clean Air Amendments 
of 1977. As a result of these Clean Air Act Amendments automobile emission 
standards were suspended until 1980-81, and many original standards simply 
became research objectives 41 According to Etsom, “with most areas of the 
country in 1977 not having attained the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for at least one pollutant, extensions to the deadlines were inevitable.”42 The 
ability of industry to use loopholes in the law to retard cleanup, in addition to the 
steady increase in the use of energy, made certain that emissions would rise in 
the future, and they did 43
The primary goal of a clean atmosphere remained largely the same, but 
the once stringent deadlines for achieving this were abandoned. Certainly 
industrial compliance relies largely upon the administrative agency in charge of 
achieving compliance. However, the Environmental Protection Agency did not 
possess enough power to be anything but flexible in its administration of the 
Clean Air Act, especially towards new industry. By 1982 some regions of the 
United States had met the set limits for a number of the targeted pollutants. 
However, most parts of the U.S. had failed to attain the standards set for carbon
39 Derek Elsom, Atmospheric Pollution: Causes. Effects, and Control Policies. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Inc., 1987) p. 164.
40 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 
1955-1985. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p.76.
41 Hays, p. 171.
42 Elsom, p.164.
43 Hays, p.76.
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monoxide, particulate matter, smog, NOx, SOx and chlorofluorocarbons.44
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments again extended deadlines for 
emission standards for a long list of pollutants, but they also established tighter 
pollution standards for ozone (smog), carbon monoxide and particulate matter, 
and attempted to extensively address the problems of acid rain and energy 
efficiency.45 Almost immediately, industry pushed for, and achieved, a federal 
regulation that drastically weakened the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 46 
This new rule allowed manufacturers to exceed atmospheric emission limits by 
as much as 245 tons of pollutants a year, merely by applying for a waiver of the 
limits 47 After being lobbied heavily by industry, this regulation was adopted by 
Vice President Dan Quayle’s business oriented Council On Competitiveness.
Following the 1970 Clean Air Act and the 1977 and 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments there have been perpetual debates, litigation, hearings, and 
proposals regarding further changes to the Clean Air Act. The private sector 
continually argues for more leniency in the Clean Air Act, as it believes that the 
cost of meeting stringent environmental goals is far too high. Industry argues 
that these costs have contributed to unemployment, inflation, a reduction in 
productivity, and the decline in U.S. competitiveness in world trade. 
Environmental groups and lobbies alternately argue the significance of strong 
environmental regulations, and debate the actual cost of environmental clean­
up. As a result of the many opposing forces between industry, the government, 
and environmental groups, the initially intended goals of environmental 
legislation, specifically the Clean Air Act in this case, have not been met.
44 Hays, p.76.
45 United States EPA, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 Summary Materials. (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 1990) p.1-5.
46 Tom Wicker, "An Environmental President," Audubon, Sept. 1992, p.44.
47 Wicker, p.44.
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The Economics of Pollution Control In The United States
An important factor to address when discussing pollution and private 
sector compliance towards environmental regulations is the economic benefits 
offered by pollution. When a factory emits wastes into the atmosphere, it is 
disposing of its wastes by the cheapest means available. The act of polluting 
the air keeps the price of its products lower than they would be if expensive 
control methods were used. As a consequence, the industry sells more 
products, thereby making more profits. Consequently, the consumers of the 
products buy them at a lower price. Thus, the pollution problems that presently 
exist are in part explainable by society’s desire for consumer products, as well 
as its desire to buy these products at the lowest short term market price.48
Pollution, in economic terms, is considered an "externality” of the market 
system. Externalities defined, "are the costs or benefits of a transaction that are 
incurred or received by other members of the society but not taken into account 
by the parties to the transaction."49 Put simply, those who are making use of the 
atmosphere for waste disposal, generally industry, are not paying for its use. In 
actuality they are passing the costs, specifically the consequences of pollution, 
including the monetary costs, onto society in general. Pollution can be costly to 
the general public in a variety of ways. Illnesses and health care connected 
with pollution involve the costs of medical care and treatment, not to mention the 
obvious costs of poor health to individuals. Additionally, air pollution adversely 
affects soil, water, agriculture, wild life, man made structures, and the weather. 
The effects of pollution upon these many factors are varied and costly. Even if 
the costs of pollution were not serious, which in fact they are, the simple 
purchase of an air conditioner by an individual to keep smoke or exhaust out of
48 Adams et. al., p.313.
49 Paul Courant, Richard Lipsey, Douglas Purvis, Peter Steiner, Microeconomics 10th Edition. 
(New York, NY: Haper Collins College Publishers, 1993) p.403.
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their house is a cost paid for by the public as a result of industrial "free riding."
In a free market economic system a harmful externality, such as pollution, 
is considered a "failure of the market."50 Still, one of the most frequent criticisms 
made by U.S. industry concerning pollution control regulations is that the high 
cost of compliance leads to plant closures and curtailments, which in turn 
causes unemployment. A car bumper sticker expresses this perception, “Are 
You Poor, Hungry, Out Of Work: Eat An Environmentalist.”51 It is argued that 
the expensive pollution control equipment which companies have to purchase, 
install, and maintain in order to meet environmental regulations and decrease 
pollution, leads to many plant closures. Thus, the private sector argues that the 
financial costs of pollution abatement are simply too great.
Between January 1971 and June 1981, the Environmental Protection 
Agency identified 153 closures in firms of 25 or more workers, totaling 32,611 
workers who lost their jobs supposedly due to environmental regulation 52 
However, the EPA found that environmental regulation was only one of the 
reasons for these closures. Many firms had closed their older, inefficient or 
obsolete plants, simply for the reasons that they were old and obsolete 53 
Furthermore, up to 40 percent of these layoffs were re-hired by their original 
companies at other plants. In comparison to these rather small numbers, the 
Reagan Administration’s 1982 budget cuts alone led to the unemployment of 
one million people in both the public and private sectors.
Pollution abatement costs for industries are indeed substantial.
However, these costs should be compared with the amount of money saved in 
wages and productivity which would be lost due to health problems caused by
50 Courant et. al., p.403.
51 Elsom, p. 174.
52 K.L. Grossman, "Job Taker or Job Maker?" Environment, Spring 1982, p.43.
53 G. R. Harris, “Positive Impacts of Environmental Policy on Business in the U.S.," International 
Environmental Studies, Spring 1981, p.75.
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air pollution. One must consider the monetary benefits of reduced medical 
treatment, as well as less damage to buildings, crops and forest areas. In 1976 
Senator Edmund Muskie, sponsor of the Clean Air Act, claimed that 15,000 
deaths per year, as well as 15 million days of restricted activity per year, 
occurred as a result of air pollution.54 Furthermore, many argue that, the 
number of jobs lost compared with those gained in the growing industry of 
pollution control is small. It has been estimated that between .5 and 1.1 million 
people are employed in public and private pollution control industries.55
There are many scientists and economists who believe that proper waste 
disposal and anti-pollution technologies can serve to create jobs rather than 
destroy them. Furthermore, environmental research and technology designed 
to preserve the environment offers limitless economic opportunities. If devices 
were to be redesigned to operate more efficiently new markets would open up 
for these more efficient products. Perhaps millions of refrigerators and air 
conditioners, both which emit chlorofluorocarbons, would eventually need to be 
replaced. In turn the opportunity for development, production, and sales of new 
refrigerators and air conditions would be enormous. This fact is a basic 
economic precept. While Japan is working on just such innovations, the United 
States is now importing most of its air pollution control devices and equipment 
from Japan.56
The current Clinton Administration, and those administrations that will 
follow, have the challenge of continuing to clean the air and improving the 
environmental quality while simultaneously encouraging economic growth. 
Industrialists and environmentalists will continue to argue the significance of 
these two goals, and each group will of course attempt to shift the balance of
54 Elsom, p. 190.
55 Grossman, p. 43.
56 Grossman, p.46.
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success in their favor. The present debate on industrial policy under the Clinton 
Administration does include plans to achieve a better balance between 
environmental and economic objectives, and encourages a more cooperative 
effort between business and government concerning environmental policy. 
However, President Clinton's plans involve little new legislation, new spending, 
or new research proposals. Furthermore, they are all "suggested policies," 
lacking any real incentives for compliance or deterrents to non-compliance.
Interestingly, the Japanese government has succeeded in achieving 
what the United States private sector claims is impossible. Japan has 
drastically improved the quality of their environment, specifically their air quality, 
while not only maintaining their strong economic situation, but experiencing 
economic growth. In fact, Japan’s gains in efficiency during the 1970’s and 
1980’s were so great that it now uses just 50 percent of the resources (materials 
and energy) that the U.S. does to produce one unit of GNP; this is said to 
translate into a 5 percent cost advantage on products.57
In summary, it is clear that American air pollution remains a major 
problem, and that it has profound implications in terms of health, economic well 
being, as well as the preservation of natural resources and surroundings. 
Furthermore, the large amount of air pollutants from American sources are 
contributing significantly to world air pollution, and may play a major role in 
changing world climate patterns as well. It can be argued that the United 
States, a nation that holds six percent of the worlds population, yet consumes 
annually over 35 percent of the world’s resources, generating proportionate 
burdens of harmful wastes, should indeed take some global environmental 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, as a result of many opposing forces between 
industry, the government, and interest groups, substantial progress has not
57 Emily Smith, “Growth Versus The Environment,” Business Week, May 11,1992, p.69.
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been made in the area of air pollution or other environmental goals in the U.S., 
specifically when compared to Japan's progressive record.
CHAPTER II
E N VIR O N M EN TA L PO LICY IN JAPAN: TH E CLEAN AIR ACT
In order to understand the process and consequences of policy-making 
in Japan, specifically environmental regulation, it is first necessary to examine 
the history and framework of the Japanese political system. Japan has a long 
tradition of institutionally separating the functions of those who reign and those 
who rule, clearly distinguishing between sovereign authority and political 
power.58 Following the Tokugawa pattern of imperial reign and feudal rule, the 
Meiji Constitution of 1889 placed sovereignty in the Emperor, but ratified a 
political structure that allowed the majority of political power to be held by the 
national bureaucracy.59 Similarly, Japan’s revamped constitution of 1947 
(modeled on the American Democratic system) places sovereignty in the 
National Diet as representative of the people, but gives the bureaucracy the 
responsibility of formulating and implementing legislation.60 Frank Upham 
states that, "the national bureaucracy remains one of the preeminent political 
groups in Japan, essentially dominating the Diet in both the formulation and 
implementation of policy."61 Chalmers Johnson similarly contends that "in 
Japan politicians reign but the bureaucrats rule."62
Furthermore, Japan’s political system is generally described as a
58 Frank Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987) p. 14.
59 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
60 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
61 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
62 Chalmers Johnson, MITI And The Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 1925- 
1975. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
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triumvirate consisting of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), top 
business management, and elite bureaucrats.63 These three groups are not 
only tightly interlocked, both politically and socially, but economically 
interdependent as well.64 Upham states,
The LDP politicians posses supreme formal authority: during periods of 
severe inter-ministerial conflict or great political sensitivity this formal 
authority becomes important politically, but in ordinary times the 
government of Japan is firmly in the hands of the bureaucracy.”65
Typically, the Diet’s legislative role consists of passing bills drafted by the 
bureaucracy. The bureaucrats have the uppermost role of both formulating as 
well as implementing policy. This of course applies to environmental policy, 
and possibly serves as the root of Japan’s success with environmental 
regulations.
Following World W ar II the Japanese government's primary commitment 
was to economic growth and the transformation of the economic base from 
agriculture and light industry to heavy industry 66 In order to achieve this rapid 
industrial development the Japanese government promoted a technology policy 
that was particularly harmful to the environment. The policy of "unbundling"
complex technology allowed producers to set up the minimum technological
core necessary for a quick, cheap start of operations.67 This policy simply 
meant that the heavy and chemical industrial plants, which did not have 
pollution control safeguards, simply dumped untreated smoke and waste into 
the environment.68 As industrialization expanded, more and more pollutants
63 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
64 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
65 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
66 Tyson et. al., p.67.
67 Koji Taira, "Dialectics of Economic Growth, National Power, and Distributive Struggles," in 
Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 
p.171.
68 Taira, p. 171.
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entered the environment. By the 1960's Japan was literally the most polluted 
nation in the world.69 In 1970 Dr. Marshal Goldman wrote of Japan's situation,
As a country with perhaps the world's highest and most sustained rate 
of economic growth, Japan is a fascinating study not only of rapid 
industrialization, but also of the environmental disruption that results 
when modernization comes too fast and haphazardly . . .  To the visiting 
ecologist Japan suggests what might happen the day before the earth 
poisons itself to death.70
Japan’s environmental movement was initiated by a series of events in 
the mid-1960’s known as the “Big Four” pollution incidents: mercury poisoning 
(from the industrial wastes released by the Japan Nitrogen Company) in 
Minamata and Niigata that killed and crippled thousands of people; air 
pollution causing asthma and bronchitis in Yokkaich; and cadmium poisoning 
in Toyama; which resulted in bone diseases. As the tendency of lawsuits on 
behalf of pollution victims increased, they became the focus of a large anti­
pollution movement in Japan. The government's reaction to this movement was 
a substantial turnabout in industrial policy.
Japan's environmental legislation culminated in a remarkable session of 
the national Diet in December, 1970 known as the "Pollution Diet." At this 
session the national government created The Environment Agency, and passed 
over a dozen laws involving pollution control. The Pollution Diet enacted a 
series of amendments and new statutes that established Japan as an innovator 
in environmental policy and eventually a leader in pollution control.71 Upham 
states of the “Pollution Diet,”
Perhaps most indicative of the political mood and the complete reversal 
of political and social momentum was the unanimous vote of the Diet to
69 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.29.
70 Marshal Goldman, Ecology and Economics: Controlling Pollution in the 197Q's. (Englewood, 
NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972) p.167.
71 Upham, Law and Social Change, p.30.
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eliminate a clause in the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control 
of 1967 that limited environmental regulation to that consistent with 
economic growth.72
This vote is considered ground breaking in terms of environmental policy, as it 
put environmental concerns on equal grounds with economic concerns.
Despite the previously bleak environmental situation, Japan's 1976 
report on the state of the environment, submitted at a meeting of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), offered an 
impressive record of achievement. This record was all the more impressive 
when compared to Japan's depressing 1972 report to the United Nations 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment which revealed Japan's 
substantial pollution problems.73 As stated by Fujikura et. al.f the 1976 report 
showed that,
In many parts of the country pollution had declined to a remarkable 
degree.74 Elsewhere it had been arrested. And in several areas 
Japanese industry had met the world’s strictest environmental 
standards.75 From an economic perspective, the most striking result of 
Japanese pollution control policies, analyzed under three economic 
models, was that GNP and employment were practically unaffected. 
Foreign observers recalling the dreary Japanese report to the 1972 
United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment may 
find this transition startling, for Westerners have come to think of Japan, 
perhaps as a result of the conference, as a veritable cauldron of 
pollution.76
It is important to note that Japan’s economy was not affected by pollution control
72 Upham, Law and Social Change, p.30.
73 Koichiro Fujikura, Julian Gresser, Akio Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan. (Boston: The 
MIT Press, 1981) p.229.
74 This is based on the OECD report, "Environmental Policies in Japan.” A report of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1977).
75 Perhaps the clearest index of environmental improvement is the dramatic reduction of S02  
(sulfur dioxide) concentrations since 1967. For example, in 1974, average concentrations were 
50 % lower than those in 1967. Concentrations of CO (Carbon Monoxide) also diminished 
substantially. All monitoring sites reporting in 1975 registered compliance with the 1975 ambient 
air quality standards.
76 Fujikura et. al., p.229.
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efforts, in fact Japan’s economy has seen steady growth despite their success 
with pollution controls.77
Japan’s situation is interesting and significant to the study of 
environmental policy making for several reasons. First, Japan’s pollution 
control efforts have been more effective than measures conducted in the United 
States or other Western countries.78 Furthermore, it is generally believed that 
pollution control regulatory policies have been executed more efficiently and 
equitably in Japan than comparable U.S. initiatives.79 Michio Hashimoto, the 
advisor to Japan’s Environment Agency and president of the Overseas 
Environmental Cooperation Center states that, “economic development and 
environmental preservation are not conflicting goals.”80 This belief is contrary 
to U.S. industry's attitudes towards environmental regulations and economic 
growth.
To a large degree, Japan's success with environmental policy can be 
traced to their regulatory process and, specifically, industry’s compliance with 
environmental regulations. This is due to the fact that Japan’s environmental 
policy is built upon an extremely strong business-bureaucracy coalition.
Another significant factor is the bureaucracy's virtual monopoly over the 
legislative process in Japan.81 Within these relationships Japan has 
successfully combined healthy economic growth with tough pollution controls.
Evidence of Japan’s Success
The Japanese government has succeeded in achieving what the United 
States often claims is impossible. Japan has drastically improved the quality of
77 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Environmental Endeavors," (Tokyo: 
Kasumigasei Chiyoda-ku,1992) p.4.
78 Fujikura et. al., p. 229.
79 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.2.
80 The Environment Agency of Japan, “Economic Development and the Environment: The 
Japanese Experience,” (Tokyo, Japan: Kasumigasei Chiyoda-ku, 1992) p.1.
81 Fujikura et. al., p.230.
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its environment, specifically the air quality, while maintaining strong economic 
growth. In fact, Japan's gains in efficiency during the 1970's and 1980's were 
so great that it now uses just 50 percent of the resources (materials and energy) 
that the U.S. does to produce one unit of Gross National Product (GNP); this 
resource efficiency is said to translate into a 5 percent cost advantage on 
products.82
Upon the commencement of Japan’s environmental regulations, Japan 
began to achieve great success in energy conservation, specifically in the 
industrial sector. As illustrated in figure 2.0, since the early 1970’s energy 
efficiency in Japan has continually improved and Japan has achieved the 
highest level of energy efficiency among the major industrialized countries.83 
Since the first oil crisis, energy consumption per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in Japan has decreased more rapidly than any other developed country.84 
Figure 2.0 illustrates that the volume of energy consumption per GDP is also the 
lowest. Adherence to policies concerning energy use, as well as the investment 
in new equipment, made this possible in Japan. A change in industrial 
processes into those which are less energy-demanding and the wide use of 
energy efficient consumer products has contributed to Japan's efficient use of 
energy.
To deal with air pollution, energy efficiency must be improved by curbing 
carbon dioxide emissions caused by energy consumption. Figure 2.1 
demonstrates that Japan emitted far less than half of the carbon dioxide emitted 
per capita in the U.S in 1988.85 This fact remains true to the present day.86 The
82 Emily Smith, "Growth Versus the Environment," Business Week, May 11, 1992, p.69.
83 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Environmental Endeavors," 1992, p.2.
84 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Energy Balances of OECD 
Countries," (Paris, France: OECD Publications, 1986 & 1987).
85 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Environment Data, "1988, 
Calculated on the basis of United Nations Energy Statistics.
86 Jacob Schlesinger, “Thinking Green: In Japan Environment Means an Opportunity for New 
Technology," The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1992, p. A10.
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emission of carbon dioxide is generally thought to increase in parallel with the 
expansion of economic growth. However, since 1973, Japan has succeeded in 
nearly stabilizing energy related carbon dioxide emissions while maintaining 
high GNP growth.87 Japan’s commitment to continue its strong pollution control 
practices was reinforced when Japan pledged in 1990 to continue to stabilize 
carbon dioxide emission over the next decade. The U.S. refused to make such 
a commitment.88
The central causes of ozone depletion are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
and halons used by industries as refrigerants in air conditioners and as 
cleansers for electronic parts. At the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the international participants agreed to the total 
phase-out of controlled CFCs by the year 2000. The United States did not 
agree to this measure, but Japan did. As of 1986 Japan's consumption of 
C FC s and Halons was less than 50 percent that of the United States (See Fig. 
2.2).89 As of 1992 Japan’s production and consumption of CFCs have been 
steadily reduced based on the schedule of the Montreal Protocol: CFC  
production has decreased by about 26 percent, and consumption has 
decreased by 33 percent in comparison to 1986 levels.90 In order to meet the 
deadlines of the Montreal Protocol, MITI provides low interest loans and tax 
incentives to companies that make efforts to recycle and reuse CFC substances, 
as well as limit their production of chlorofluorocarbons and halons.91 
Furthermore, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry stated in July of
87 OECD, "Environment Data," 1988.
88 Ibid., p.A10.
89 UNEP, Statistical Yearbook, 1986..
90 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.5.
91 The Environment Agency of Japan, "Economic Development and the Environment: The 
Japanese Experience," 1992.
Consumption of Controlled CFCs ond Halons in Major Nations (1986)
330.1 317.9
Per capita consumption 
Unit; kg
Total consumption 
Unit; tons
Source: UNEP, Statistical Yowbook (1986)
Figure 2.2
26
1990 that it was increasing financial help to industries that emit CFCs.92
Acid Rain, an additional result of air pollution, develops when air absorbs 
sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) produced by burning fossil fuels. 
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, by 1987 
acid rain had destroyed over 30 percent of Europe's forests. Acid rain also 
acidifies the soil and bodies of water, causing damage to crops, vegetation, and 
fish. Even marble and metal structures are damaged and eroded by acid rain. 
Since 1973, Japan has regulated NOx and SOx emissions from commercial 
and industrial sources. According to the Organization for Economic 
Development, Japanese environmental standards for SOx and NOx emissions, 
as well as for other particles associated with acid rain, are the strictest in the 
world.93 Furthermore, as shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4, 76 percent of the world’s 
desulfurization and denitrification plants are located in Japan, more than six 
times the number of desulfurization plants and twelve times the number of 
denitrification plants as in the United States as of 1989 94 Japan’s 2,189  
desulfurization and denitrification plants represent the highest number of such 
plants in the world.95
Additionally, Japanese companies use enhanced fuels or fuels with low 
sulfur levels to meet Japan’s strict standards. As a result of these efforts,
Japan's per capita emissions of SOx and NOx in 1989 were 7.8 percent and 12 
percent respectively of U.S. levels, as shown in Figure 2.5. Furthermore, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.6, Japan's levels of SOx and NOx emitted from industry 
dropped significantly through the 1980's, indicating successful industrial 
compliance towards emission regulations. As indicated by figures 2.7 and 2.8,
92 The Environment Agency of Japan, 1992.
93 Organization for Economic Development, Environmental Policies in Japan. (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 1977) p.25.
94 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, p.7.
95 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, p.7.
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by 1986 and 1987 Japan’s SOx and NOx emissions were well below U.S. 
emission levels.96 As of 1992 Japan's SOx emission level was 4 percent that of 
the United States, and the NOx emission level was 6 percent of the U.S. level.97
It seems clear from these statistics that Japan is continually attempting to 
strike a balance between economic growth and ecological soundness. Japan’s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry was once entirely focused on 
increasing industrial productivity, now it seems to focus on combining sound 
economic growth with tough pollution controls. In Japan, Environmental 
innovation is gradually becoming linked to industrial competitiveness.
Research and Development in Japan
Japan has put a great deal of money into research to help industry solve 
pollution problems. Most of The Ministry of International Trade and Industry's 
(M ITI) 50 million dollar global outlays in 1991 went to government-industry 
projects to develop environmentally friendly technology.98 Furthermore, MITI 
designed a detailed 100 year blueprint on how to eliminate a variety of 
pollutants, and recently opened a new Research Institute of Innovative 
Technology for the Earth (RITE); the world’s first commercial environmental 
technology institute.99 In 1992 RITE was given a budget of 6.2 billion yen and 
additionally received 8,000 million yen from local governments and industry, 
making RITE the largest project ever launched by M ITI.100 MITI has also set up 
the International Center for Environmental Technology Transfer, so that other 
nations can benefit and contribute to this undertaking.
96 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Environment Data," 1987.
97 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, 1987, p. 10.
98 Christopher Anderson, "A Huge Increase For Global Environment," Nature, January, 1991, 
p.95. These R&D expenditures are not to be confused with the R&D budget of Japan's 
Environment Agency. The noted expenditures are projects of MITI, a separate agency from the 
Environment Agency.
99 Anderson, p.95.
100 Anderson, p.94.
RITE is modeled after the government-industry consortia that made 
Japan world competitive in semiconductors and computers. It is currently 
targeting seven fields, and each project has up to 16 companies participating. 
Many other Japanese ministries, such as the Construction Ministry and the 
Agriculture Ministry are joining in the venture and starting their own 
environmental programs. This substantial support for technical assistance and 
research programs is meant to encourage industries to reduce their produced 
waste and to identify new processes to control pollution. By comparison, the 
U.S. government spends relatively little money on waste reduction or research 
efforts. For example, in 1988 the EPA's budget request for activities to minimize 
waste was only .03 percent of its operating budget.101 (See Fig. 2.9).
Fig. 2.9 Government Subsidies for Environmental Research and 
Development, In Millions of U.S. Dollars (At 1980 Price Level) And As A 
Percentage of Total Research and Development Expenditures.
1975 1979 1983 1985
$ % $ % $ % $ %
United States: $235.6 .9 $308.5 1.0 $171.6 .5 $198.2 .5
Japan: $ 62.6 1.5 $ 81.3 1.6 $ 80.4 1.4 ........................
•Source: OECD, Environmental Data Compendium (Paris: OECD, 1987), p.301.
Clearly, the Japanese are reaching both environmental and economic 
goals while continuing to put a great deal of money into further research to help 
solve environmental problems. If Japanese companies are as successful at 
creating environmental technology as they have been in so many other 
consumer and industrial markets, the United States may face the real possibility 
that environmental competitiveness will ultimately exacerbate trade tensions. 
American policy makers would then be placed in the awkward political position 
of trying to discourage the domestic sale of environmentally sounder products
101 Adams et. al., p.343.
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even as they champion the virtues of clean air and environmental protection.
In summary, although Japan and the U.S. share similar formal political 
structures, and have implemented almost identical pollution policies, Japan's 
regulations, specifically air pollution regulations, have been implemented more 
successfully. This success in achieving industrial compliance is primarily due to 
the bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws and 
cooperate with industry in their implementation. Importantly, the relationship 
between business and government in Japan is not adversarial, rather it involves 
many avenues of formal and informal cooperation. Additionally, the Japanese 
government offers many research and financial incentives to industries in order 
to reinforce a strong working relationship between the public and private 
sectors in their efforts towards environmental clean up.
CHAPTER III
INDUSTRY AND AIR POLLUTION:
A Case Study of the Automobile Industry in the United States and
Japan
Fig. 3.0
Automobile Emission Standards 
Japan and Selected Countries 
(g/km)
CO HC NOx
Japan (1976) 2.10 0.25 0.60
Japan (1978) 2.10 0.25 0.25
U.S.A.(1975) 9.30 0.93 1.93
U.S.A.(California 1975) 5.60 0.56 1.25
Canada (1975) 15.62 1.25 1.94
Sweden(1976) 24.20 2.10 1.90
CO=Carbon Monoxide / HC=Hydrocarbons / NOx=Nitrogen Oxides 
'Source: OECD Environmental Policies in Japan, Paris 1977
It has previously been suggested that several factors are responsible for 
Japan’s success with pollution controls and regulatory compliance. The 
absence of these same factors can also explain the United States’ 
comparatively anemic efforts and accomplishments with this same goal. In brief 
these factors include 1) Japan’s strong business - bureaucracy coalition as 
opposed to a powerful U.S. private sector constantly resisting administrative 
regulations 2) Financial aid and incentives given to Japanese industry to 
induce both research and compliance compared to a lack of little or no financial 
or research assistance in the U.S. 3) A pluralistic U.S. political system that 
serves to debate and dilute substantial pieces of legislation, thus destroying the 
initial purpose of legislation, as opposed to Japan’s relatively closed political
30
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system. These points can be effectively illustrated in a case study of industrial 
compliance following the enactment of the Clean Air Acts in both Japan and the 
United States.
Kelley, et al. state that, “The hallmark of contemporary American industry 
is bigness.”102 As of 1976 half of all manufacturing assets were held by the 
hundred largest companies in America.103 According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, although smaller companies have made substantial gains and 
have softened this statistic, this figure remains fairly accurate.104 Most of these 
large industries (automobile, steel, paper, petrochemical, oil, and power) are 
oligopolistic. The most powerful firms in these areas adopt very cohesive 
positions on environmental policy. Kelley et al. state of these firms,
Concealed behind a public-relations smoke screen of exhortations 
about the need to balance environmental protection with continued 
industrial growth, they consistently resist the enactment and 
enforcement of legislation designed to promote environmental 
policy.105
U.S. firms believe that it is in their best interest to resist any government controls 
which would increase their production costs. Some industries are, of course, 
more adversely affected by control efforts than others. These include such 
industries as automobile manufacturers, oil companies, and electric power 
utilities. This combination of resistance by the relatively few, but politically and 
economically powerful, industries serves to adversely affect U.S. environmental 
policy through strong anti-control lobbies at all levels of government.106
102 Donald Kelley, Kenneth Stunkel, Richard Wescott, The Economic Superpowers and The 
Environment: The United States. The Soviet Union, and Japan. (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman 
and Company, 1976) p.29.
103 Kelley et. al., p.29.
104 Howard Schreier, The United States Department of Commerce, July 20,1993.
105 Kelley et. al., p.30.
106 pau| Downing, Air Pollution And The Social Sciences. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 
p.5.
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Once again we will examine the Clean Air Act of 1970 to study U.S. 
industry’s reaction to environmental legislation. The 1970 Clean Air Act was the 
strongest piece of legislation aimed at restoring and maintaining the quality of 
the environment yet passed in the United States. It was designed to give the 
nation a clean and healthy atmosphere by the mid 1970’s. However, 
considerable opposition from the private sector, in conjunction with the energy 
and economic crisis, resulted in a great deal of relaxation in this goal. An 
example of this effort to resist and reduce regulations can be provided by the 
automobile industry.
The 1970 Clean Air Act gave many new powers to the Environmental 
Protection Agency in a variety of areas affecting air pollution. With regard to 
auto emissions, the law required a 90 percent reduction in emissions from the 
levels produced by 1970 models of automobiles. These reductions were to be 
achieved by January 1, 1975 for unburned hydrocarbons and carbon 
monoxide, and by January 1, 1976 for nitrogen oxides. These standards could 
be deferred for one year beyond the 1975 and 1976 target dates upon 
application by individual manufacturers. The deferment was dependent upon 
whether the EPA Administrator determined after a hearing, that 1) meeting the 
standards by the dates set was not technologically feasible, and 2) that the 
company in question had made a “good faith” effort to meet the standards 
stipulated by the law.107
In 1970, the American automobile manufacturers were denounced as 
one of the nation’s largest contributors to air pollution, accounting for about one 
third of all health imperiling chemicals released into the air in the 1970’s.108 In 
many cities pollution levels were several times higher than federal health
107 “The Question of Relaxing Automobile Emission Controls,” The Congressional Digest, March 
1974, p.73.
108 uc ar Trouble,” The New Republic, August 11,1973.
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standards recommended. Additionally, the EPA had found that one quarter of 
the children in cities had unacceptable lead levels in their bodies from 
breathing air contaminated with lead from exhaust.109 There was no doubt that 
the need for a substantial decline in automobile engine pollutants was a 
necessity. However, the emission standards in the Clean Air Act of 1970 met 
much opposition from the American automobile industry, an industry whose 
managers had traditionally exercised a great deal of autonomy concerning the 
external environment.
The United States automobile industry so vehemently attempted to 
abolish the Clean Air Act’s regulations that it initiated one of the most intense 
lobbying efforts of its time. Both Edward Cole, President of General Motors, and 
Lee lacocca, Executive Vice President of Ford, personally took their case to 
Washington, lacocca, who called a meeting of key Ford suppliers and dealers 
to mount a large telegram campaign, went so far as to claim that the bill, “could 
prevent continued production of automobiles after Jan. 1 , 1975.”110 Lobbyists 
for the automobile industry met with Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, in an attempt to garner support for 
interventions against the 1975 deadline. According to the automobile 
companies these regulations were considered a total infringement upon free- 
market objectives and a continual disruption in the functioning of their 
companies.111
The automobile industries stated that the Clean Air Act stipulations 
exceeded their technological capabilities, and that attainment of the vehicle 
emission standards for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons by 1975, and for
109 The United States Environmental Protection Agency, “National Air Quality and Emissions 
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oxides of nitrogen by 1976, was impossible.112 The resistance by the auto 
companies took various forms, from lobbying Congress in order to delay the 
implementation of standards, to igniting media campaigns, to simply refusing to 
meet emissions standards and mandates on tim e.113 Conversely, many 
scientists as well as politicians and environmentalists were convinced that the 
automobile industry could, and should be expected to, comply with the 
standards of the Clean Air Act. Senator Muskie claimed that Detroit already 
possessed the laboratory technology to meet the 1975 standards.
The earliest filing date for complaints about the deadline was January 1, 
1972. General Motors, then the richest company in America, was the first to 
approach the EPA on January 12. Shortly following General Motor’s initiative, 
Ford and Chrysler made separate appeals. Together the automobile 
companies showered the EPA with more than 2,000 pages of evidence 
claiming that despite its best efforts, the industry would not be able to meet the 
deadline dates. In April 1972, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency held a hearing on the 1975 emission control standards required by the 
Clean Air Act. This time the “Big Three of Detroit” (General Motors, Chrysler, 
and Ford) insisted on at least a one year postponement of the implementation of 
the standards. Testifying before officials of the EPA in Washington, executives 
of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors stated that their 
vehicles could not meet the strict and “unrealistic” standards for exhaust 
emissions.
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus could 
grant an extension only if the industry demonstrated that the required 
technology did not exist, despite a “good faith” effort to comply. According to
112 Elsom, p.171.
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Ruckelshaus the automobile industry simply did not meet this requirement. 
Ruckelshaus stated that, “They have not established that the technology does 
not exist. The auto industry has neither built adequate test facilities nor 
provided adequate financial support or cooperated with independent 
suppliers.”114 Significantly, the fact that two Japanese auto companies had 
already begun manufacturing cars that met the 1975 U.S. standards helped 
persuade Ruckelshaus to veto the request for an extension. However, the auto 
makers appealed the EPA's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Washington. The Court found in February 1973 that economic considerations 
had to be taken into account despite claims to the contrary by the EPA’s 
Administrator William Ruckelshaus.115 Thus, in April 1973, the Environmental 
Protection Agency was forced to succumb to the pressures of the automobile 
industry and granted a one year extension for many emission standards.116
While Ruckelshaus eventually granted this extension, he did establish 
two sets of interim standards for 1975, one for cars sold in California and the 
other for cars sold elsewhere (See Fig. 3.0). These national interim standards 
were still strict enough that the auto makers were forced to use catalysts in 
California models. Chrysler Corporation, behind GM and Ford in research and 
technology, had the biggest problem with these new standards. Chrysler 
opposed the use of catalysts even in California, stating that it could not comply. 
Ruckelshaus, however, expressed doubts as to whether Chrysler had made a 
“good faith” effort to meet the original standards. Engelhard Industries had 
testified at the EPA hearings that Chrysler had refused to buy its catalysts 
because Engelhard had supported the original Clean Air Acts standards.117 
Chrysler denied this charge.
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Upon achieving this one year extension the US automobile companies 
had a double strategy. They wanted the extra year to continue working out the 
problems with catalysts and to propose interim emission levels for 1975 that 
would not need catalysts. More importantly, they tightened their campaign to 
get Congress to relax or repeal the Clean Air Acts standards altogether. In fact, 
Chrysler came up with a whole media campaign stating just this intent. They 
argued that the strict regulations were not necessary for public health and 
would raise car prices substantially. Executives from the automobile companies 
continually lobbied senators and representatives, attempting to get 
amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced by members of both political 
parties.
Resistance by the U.S. Automobile Company
Considering them a detrimental infringement, The Ford Motor Company 
was very much opposed to the politically imposed emission standards, and thus 
was one of the largest lobbying forces behind the automobile industry’s attempt 
to continually postpone attainment dates. Ford vigorously lobbied all levels of 
government, and avidly stated its position at a series of Washington hearings, 
as well as to individual politicians and to the public. Ford’s Chairman, Henry 
Ford II sadly declared that, “They (the government) took the fun out of the 
business.”118 Helen Petrauskas, Ford’s current Vice President of Environmental 
and Safety Engineering explains, “Ford was asked to meet certain requirements 
piecemeal - do this by this date, so much by this year, and then do this, and so 
on, meaning that every year, we had to regroup and come up with more 
changes.”119 The Clean Air Act Regulations were not only seen as an 
infringement upon free market objectives, but were also considered a continual
118 Shook, p.7.
119 Shook, p.6.
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disruption in the functioning of the company.
General Motors, along with the other U.S. auto manufacturers, were well 
known for resisting industrial policies. General Motors, one of the worlds 
biggest manufacturing companies, already had a history of discrepancies in the 
areas of both automobile safety and pollution. Ralph Nader’s 1960 protests on 
the design and safety record of the Corvair forced GM to discontinue the Corvair 
model. In California in 1966, G M ’s spokesmen protested against proposed 
legislation establishing tougher standards for auto exhausts. It would be 
impossible for GM to comply, they claimed. However, once the legislation had 
been passed, it turned out not to be impossible for GM to meet the new 
California standards. In 1969 the auto industry’s conspiracy to evade 
technological revisions was exposed when the Justice Department filed an 
antitrust suit against the domestic manufacturers and their trade association, the 
Automobile Manufacturers Association. It was found that the AMA and four 
automobile corporations had been conspiring to restrain the development and 
marketing of auto exhaust control systems since 1953.120 The evidence 
brought together by a Los Angeles grand jury outlined the cross-licensing 
agreement and other close associations between these so called “auto 
competitors” that forged this illegal, “united front of inaction.”121 In September 
1969 the domestic auto companies entered into a consentual agreement with 
the government agreeing never to engage in such a conspiracy again. Yet, in 
the 1970’s they again united in a full blown effort to evade the Clean Air Act’s 
emission standards.
Following the Clean Air Act of 1970 General Motors again vehemently 
protested the new national standards. GM's Chairman, James Roche publicly 
denounced the Clean Air Act, referring to it as, “A crusade for radical changes
120 Shook, p. 13.
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in our system of corporate, ownership- -changes so radical that they would all 
but destroy free enterprise as we know it.”122 Although Ford and GM genuinely 
believed that they were being asked to do more than their share for the 
environment, one shouldn’t overlook the fact that in the last quarter of 1972 they 
turned the greatest profits that they had yet recorded, netting 252 million dollars 
and 651 million dollars respectively.123
Ralph Nader, a consumer activist who protested against safety 
discrepancies in the auto industry in the 1960's, entered the arena to confront 
the auto industry’s resistance to emission standards. Nader stated,
What the giant auto corporations say they cannot accomplish in 1975, 
two small Japanese auto companies have already accomplished. 
According to official US Environmental Protection Agency test results, 
Honda and Toyo Kogyo have easily met the 1975 standards for 
50,000 miles with their respective vehicles. In these durability tests 
the Japanese vehicles performed well under the levels of emissions 
permitted for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and oxides of 
nitrogen.124
Nader also pointed out that the National Academy of Sciences, in a report 
prepared for Congress under the Clean Air Act, concluded that the US auto 
industry would be able to meet the 1975 standards with four types of systems. 
These systems included 1) a modified conventional engine equipped with an 
oxidation catalyst, 2) carbureted stratified charge engine (like Honda), 3) a 
Wankel engine equipped with a thermal reactor (Mazda), and 4) the diesel 
engine. Contrary to the US industries claims, the NAS found that the domestic 
manufacturers could meet the 1975 standards with modified conventional 
engines equipped with an oxidation catalyst.125
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The Automobile Industry’s Success
The First Session of the 93rd Congress saw the introduction of a number 
of bills directed specifically at the question of modifying emission standards. 
Additionally, several committees such as the Senate Committee on Public 
Works, the Senate Committee on Air and Water Pollution, and The House 
Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, held hearings concerning 
this issue. In December 1973, the House opened floor debate on the proposed 
National Energy Emergency Act, which included emission control modifications 
to the Clean Air Act. In June, 1974 Congress passed the Energy Supply and 
Environmental Coordination Act, which extended the emissions deadline for yet 
another year.126 Shortly following this extension, the Ford Motor Company 
asked for a third one year extension of the auto emission deadlines.127
In March of 1975 the House Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment began hearings on issues related to amending the 1970 Clean Air 
Act. After more pressure from the automobile industry, and claims that the 
regulations were too difficult to reach and were affecting production, the EPA 
suspended the emission standards until 1977 and 1978, to allow vehicle 
manufacturers to devote more time to improving fuel economy. However, the 
automobile industry claimed that vehicle emission requirements were adversely 
affecting the automobile industry and would give foreign producers an 
advantage over the U.S. automobile industry. These economic and 
technological arguments gained increasing public, media and government 
attention as the energy crisis emerged and was followed by an economic 
recession.
In what became an enduring campaign for the automobile industry, the 
big three auto manufacturers again asked Congress to delay the emission
126 Nader, "I Think I Cant," p.13.
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standards scheduled for the 1977 and 1978 model cars. The standards cannot 
be met, they once again claimed, without a drop in fuel mileage and increases 
in car prices. Chrysler stated that 1977 standards would raise new car prices by 
260 dollars. All of the auto companies said that the 1978 standard for nitrogen 
oxides could not be met. In contrast, two Japanese made cars, Honda and the 
Wankel powered Mazda, had already met the 1975 standards by 1973, without 
using catalysts (the controversial engine that the US auto makers were using to 
cut emissions). Honda also easily met the 1976 nitrogen oxides standard. 
Richard Ayers of the Natural Resources Defense Council stated, “That engine 
(Hondas) destroys Detroit’s case. What can they say when a relatively midget 
company does what the giants cant.”128
Still, the U.S. automobile companies continued making cars under 1977 
standards because they thought that Congress was going to grant them an 
extension. Both Houses of Congress had indicated that this was their intent.
The Senate had passed a bill extending 1977 standards one year. The House 
of Representatives adopted an amendment offered by John Dingell, a Democrat 
from Michigan who served a constituency largely dependent on the automobile 
industry. Dingell’s amendment would have given the industry five years to 
gradually meet the revised final emission standards.129 However, Utah 
Senator Jake Gam, a Republican from Utah, filibustered against the 
compromised version of the bill. Ironically Senator Garn sympathized with the 
auto industry in terms of granting them more lenient standards. However, Garn 
was angry about a totally separate provision of the bill, that had nothing to do 
with the automobile industry.
Senator Garn contested a separate provision that said Utah and other
----------------------------------------------  i
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unpolluted states could not pollute up to the national limits; they must keep their 
air clean, with no significant deterioration. To Garn and his constituents this 
seemed to be a ban on any further industrialization. So Garn filibustered 
against the whole bill, killing it for that session of Congress. In doing so he 
destroyed the limited reprieve Congress was prepared to give the automobile 
industry.
However, the automobile industries' case was reinforced with the energy
crisis (the oil embargo of 1973), rising unemployment, and continual claims that
stringent vehicle emission requirements were adversely affecting the
%
automobile industry and would give foreign producers an advantage over the 
U.S. automobile industry. These factors served to slowly ease the political and 
public weight on the auto industry to meet emission standards. Eventually 
Clean Air Act Amendments were passed in August 1977. These amendments 
postponed the original 1975-6 carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon standards 
until 1981, and relaxed the standard for oxides of nitrogen to take effect later 
than 1981, not specified.130 Many of the initial 1970 standards were never met 
as the legislation was debated, lobbied and eventually diluted. It is important to 
understand that this lobbying to continually avoid and push back emission 
standards was and is not endemic to the automobile industry. Several other 
industries have succeeded in other emission postponements as well (DuPont 
recently lobbied aggressively for many of the 1990 amendments to the Clean 
Air Act).
This case study illustrates that environmental policy making in the United 
States is marked by intense industrial lobbies, and takes place against a 
platform of decentralization in both policy-making and administrative functions. 
As is illustrated by the auto industry's continual lobbying efforts in Congress, the
130 Elsom, p. 171.
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Executive Branch, the EPA, and the public arena, the U.S. political system is 
extraordinarily open, or pluralistic, in the sense that competing interests can 
organize and lobby all levels of government with few restrictions. In 
conjunction with this pluralistic environment is the assumption that all sides will 
have their say in some appropriate forum. However, as environmental lobbies 
have typically lacked the financial resources of business, and thus the ensuing 
political power of business that follows from financial resources, environmental 
regulations often express the interests of industry in the United States.
Industrial and business groups have distinct advantages in their struggle 
with environmental lobbies. They are very knowledgeable about the formal as 
well as the informal rules by which the political system operates. Many 
business lobbyists are highly paid lawyers or experts in technical fields; hence 
they can participate directly or indirectly in the legislative process by suggesting 
policies or by providing industry sponsored data or commentary on proposed 
environmental legislation.131 Additionally, campaign contributions are an 
effective tool for the private sector, with the implied threat of political sanctions 
and loss of further funds to a candidate for failure to resist regulations. Private 
Sector lobbyists may also generate a deluge of letters or organize other public 
opinion measures to support their pro-growth, anti-regulation efforts.
Although environmentalists can use similar tactics, the business lobbyists 
are better equipped with funds, as most environmental organizations are 
dependent on voluntary contributions which are not tax deductible.
Furthermore, environmental groups with tax exempt status are legally forbidden 
to lobby, whereas business firms can write off as business expenses many 
costs associated with their lobbying.132 These factors have all served to give 
strength to industry’s effort to oppose and limit environmental regulations in the
131 Kelley et. al., p. 153.
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United States. In the United States the decade of thel 970’s was referred to as 
the “environmental decade” as a result of the large body of environmental 
legislation enacted by Congress during that time. But the implementation of the 
legislation is still occurring well into the 1990’s; not only Clean Air legislation, 
but Clean Water, Superfund, and many other pieces of environmental 
legislation.
Japan’s Automobile Industry And The Clean Air Act
As previously established, due to the fact that Japan was a late 
developing nation and needed centralized political and financial controls to 
develop economically, policy making in Japan takes place through an elaborate 
process of consensus making dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (until 
recently), government bureaucracies, and industry. This approach minimizes 
political conflict, and results in a tightly restricted decision making system in 
which the majority of policy proposals come from the bureaucracies 
themselves.133 Additionally, the LDP and MITI have provided industry with tax 
breaks and tariff shields in order to entice them to reach emission goals. 
Furthermore, both the Japanese government and business place a great deal of 
importance on innovation and new technology. Subsequently, both the public 
and private sectors invest a great deal of money into research and 
development. In 1971, research on electronics, motor vehicle safety, and 
pollution control, received top priority for research and development in 
Japan.134
Detroit auto makers did indeed spend millions of dollars attempting to 
improve automobile emissions. However, the U.S. government told its
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automobile companies to reach the same standards as Japanese industry, yet 
offered little financial or research assistance to achieve this goal. Perhaps this 
is why most automobile innovations have been the work of foreign automobile 
companies. With the exception of the turbine, all of the more promising 
alternative automobile engines have been developed in Europe and Japan.
The only long standing government automotive research and 
development effort in the U.S. has been that of the Army Tank Automotive 
Command.135 The primary government responsibility for civilian automotive 
research and development in the 1970’s was placed in the Energy Research 
and Development Administration (ERDA).136 The funding for Alternative 
automotive engines program was about three tenths of one percent of ERDA’s 
energy research and development budget. This was 5.6 million in fiscal 1971 
and 7.2 million in 1975.137 Research funding and tax incentives for industry in 
the United States is quite a different situation from that of Japan.
In September 1971, the responsibility of setting Japan’s auto emission 
standards was transferred from the Ministry of Transportation to the newly 
created Environment Agency. Japan’s automobile induced air pollution was as 
bad if not worse than U.S. levels. In 1970 and 1971 photochemical smog was 
so abundant in Japanese cities that it was becoming a significant health hazard. 
By 1972 Japan’s new Environment Agency had laid out recommendations for 
auto emission standards to be met in Japan by 1975 and 1976. Japan decided 
to adopt the same emission standards as the U.S. Clean Air Act standards 
(some of Japan's were actually more stringent). Because the U.S. was a major 
market for Japanese automobiles, Japan reasoned that it would have to meet 
U.S. standards anyway.
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However, by 1973 the U.S. EPA had extended its enforcement 
deadlines. Consequently, Japanese automobile companies argued that it was 
not immediately necessary to meet the U.S. standards. Because of this 
opposition the Environment Agency requested that a Central Council 
reconsider the 1976 NOx standards, much as the U.S. had. The Central 
Council initiated an Expert Advisory Committee on Automotive Production and 
set out to reexamine the issue.138 After a great deal of investigation the Central 
Council maintained that the auto industry possessed the technology to meet the 
1976 NOx standard, but did require more time to mass produce these new 
engines.139
With the conclusion of the controversy over the 1976 deadline The 
Environment Agency established plans for obtaining compliance by the new 
1978 deadline. During this time the Air Pollution Bureau assembled a study 
group on NOx emission control in order to bypass any future complications.
The NOx study group gathered data on new technological developments that 
could improve emission standards, and researched the issues that were certain 
to be debated in the future regarding the capability of reaching NOx emission 
regulations. The NOx study group worked with automobile industry executives 
and independent research technicians to investigate all problems that could 
arise with industry compliance.
The Japanese Automobile Company
In 1973, the whole nature of the issue changed. Previously, in February 
1971, Honda Motor had announced the development of its new Compound 
Vortex Controlled Combustion (CVCC) engine system. This system was created 
in order to meet automobile exhaust emission control regulations for both Japan
138 Fujikura et. al., p. 270.
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and the United States. In 1973, around the same time that the United States 
decided to postpone the initial standards of the Clean Air Act, Honda Motor’s 
cars with CVCC engines were introduced to the public. Honda's introduction of 
the CVCC engine made the formerly minor auto maker one of the major players 
in the U.S. market. In 1973 the National Academy of Sciences in the United 
States gave top marks to Honda’s CVCC engine, which it said was the world’s 
first to meet the 1975 standards set forth by the U.S. Clean Air Act.140 In tests 
held in Michigan, Honda’s four cylinder engines, using no catalysts, achieved 
pollution counts well below EPA standards even after running for 50,000 miles. 
Honda executives announced that they would no longer seek any 
postponements in emission requirements, and that their new car, the Civic, 
would go on sale in the U.S. by 1974.141
In May 1973, a hearing was held on the Japanese 1975 emission control 
standards. While many of the Japanese manufacturers did favor a 
postponement, Honda Motor and Toyo Kogyo stated unequivocally that they 
could meet the standards on time.142 Many of the other auto companies 
announced that with tax incentives and research funding they too could meet 
the 1978 standards. In August, 1976, five of the nine Japanese automobile 
companies announced at a hearing held by the study group that they would 
meet the NOx standard in 1978.143 The NOx study group immediately 
concluded its report and announced to the Environment Agency that all 
emission standards could and would be met by 1978. Subsequently, all of the 
Japanese automobile manufacturers were able to meet Japan’s 1978 emission 
standards which called for a 90 percent reduction in most emissions.144
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Eiji Toyoda recounts the process of reaching emission standards at 
Toyota during the early 1970’s. Eiji states,
Naturally, we knew that there was little solid evidence to support the case 
for tighter regulations. The only answer the Environment Agency could 
give us was: ‘It’s better to have clean air than dirty air.’ But implementing 
auto emissions controls will raise the price of cars, we insisted. ‘Money is 
of no concern when it comes to people’s health, they replied.’ There was 
nothing we could say to that.145
The challenge was in both maintaining Toyota’s existing performance levels 
and meeting the standards. Toyota worked with MITI, the Environment Agency, 
and eventually Honda, to reach emission standards. Eiji Toyoda stated that 
initially the company saw little hope of meeting the final target by the specified 
date:
W e had the whole company working on the problem, but when we 
learned of the merits of the low emissions CVCC engine developed by 
Honda, we swallowed our pride and asked them for the technology. 
These efforts were applauded by the Environment Agency.146
Toyota eventually reached all of the emission standards set by the Environment 
Agency due to the combined efforts of business, government, and inter­
business relations.
Compliance by Japan’s Automobile Industry
What is remarkable is that while the biggest automobile company in the 
world, General Motors, was still at the design stage, two small Japanese 
companies had already designed engines that passed emission tests in U.S. 
and Japanese factories and had put these new engines into the marketplace 
(Honda’s Civic and Toyo Kogyo’s Mazda). The success of the Japanese
145 Eiji Toyoda, Tovota: Fifty Years in Motion. (New York: Kodansha International, 1985) p.140.
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automobile industry in meeting stringent standards can be attributed to a variety 
of factors. Primary among these factors were the Japanese government's many 
efforts to work with the automobile industry on achieving emission standards. 
Unlike the United States, when the Japanese government and Environment 
Agency announced their stringent regulations they also attempted to achieve 
compliance by offering recommendations and advice concerning technical and 
economic difficulties. An additional motivation was the generous tax incentives 
and research funding that were offered in order to reward companies that 
produced low pollution cars, and penalized companies that did not.
Environment Agency officials also relied on the Study Group on NOx Emission 
Control to bring technical problems of compliance into an arena that allowed 
government and industry to work together to acquire more knowledge regarding 
emission capabilities, and to discuss present technological problems regarding 
compliance issues.
The effectiveness of administrative guidance, as well as research and 
financial aid from the government, help explain why Japanese automobile 
companies did not challenge the implementation of the Environment Agency’s 
regulation through extensive litigation as the U.S. auto industries did.147 This 
guidance by Japan’s administrative agencies also provides an explanation as 
to why Japan was able to reach their designated emission standards while the 
United States automobile industries were not. In sum, the close relationship 
between the bureaucracy and industry in Japan has served to achieve 
environmental ideals as easily as they have also served economic growth. In 
fact, they have currently achieved one without sacrificing the other.
147 Fujikura et. al., p. 273.
C H A PTER  IV 
P LU R A LITY  A N D  E N V IR O N M E N T A L PO LIC Y
The United States political system was designed to represent a variety of 
interests. The Founding Fathers wanted a government that was responsive to 
the people. They also wanted a government of balanced and limited powers. 
Thus, from the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 until the present day, the 
principle of separation of powers has existed at the core of the American 
Constitutional order. Although powers are not separated in a pure sense, the 
three branches of government do encompass distinctly different responsibilities 
and practices. It has often been suggested that the separation of powers makes 
it extremely difficult for American institutions to generate the political leadership 
necessary to make strong coherent policy, and instead often inhibits action and 
coordination in government. James McGregor Burns argues that,
The fear of arbitrary power and majority tyranny so dominated the 
minds of the framers that they devised a political system that made any 
kind of effective political action extremely difficult, if not impossible.. . to 
a large extent our system was designed for deadlock and inaction.148
Added to this system is a market-based economy in which information 
and competition is allocated through independent players in an economic 
market that is dislocated from the political system. In this arena there is a lack of 
centralized power and a great deal of fragmentation. Private groups,
148 Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey Tullis, "The Constitution, Politics and the Presidency," in 
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specifically well organized and wealthy groups, have many advantages in this 
system. Interest groups can penetrate the political decision making process at 
virtually all levels. Administrative agencies are open to direct infiltration by 
groups concerned with specific agency decisions. Political representatives are 
also susceptible to groups with financial resources and political power. Finally, 
in this plural system the media is a powerful tool to those who have the 
resources to use it. As noted earlier, all of these factors contributed to the 
success of the U.S. automobile lobby in defeating environmental regulations. 
Thus, the plurality of the separated U.S. political system infringes upon the 
implementation of its environmental regulations.
This is not to say that U.S. decision makers are hapless victims of 
societal pressure groups. They are not. U.S. leaders have been able to 
formulate clear policy objectives. In international monetary issues, they have 
had a relatively free hand because of the arenas in which decisions have been 
made.149 However, the structural characteristics of the American polity allow 
domestic groups to impose more constraints on the state than in most other 
advanced countries.
Political Economies and Environmental Policy
In the pluralistic political system of the U.S., the economic system further 
aggravates the already fragmented system. When analyzing comparative 
environmental policy, the central factor to examine is how, and to what extent, 
the national government goes about interacting or intervening with private 
sector practices. Max W eber made the distinction between a “market economy” 
and a “planned economy.” A market economy is a political economy in which
149 On the importance of decision-making arenas see E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi- 
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the private sector makes independent economic decisions and the central 
government allows or encourages the private sector to act independently. Put 
simply, in a market-based system such as that of the U.S., the government is 
essentially removed from the economic market. Thus, U.S. leaders have 
relatively few policy instruments for intervening in the economy. In a planned 
economy, which Japan maintains many elements of, the government decides 
the overall direction of the economy; it influences the economy by directing its 
funding to specific industries or markets. Certainly all states intervene in the 
economy to a certain extent, the question is to what degree.
Chalmers Johnson labels modern Japan as “plan rational”, and defines 
the United States as “market rational.” Johnson states,
A market rational state concerns itself with the forms and procedures of 
economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive 
matters. The plan rational state, by contrast, has as its dominant feature 
precisely the setting of such substantive social and economic goals.150
Furthermore, Johnson states that the most important evaluative standard in a 
market rational society is efficiency, as compared to effectiveness taking 
precedence in a plan rational system. Consequently, plan rational systems are 
capable of greater effectiveness than the market rational system in handling 
industrial policy, and specifically pollution regulation. The fact that Japan has 
many characteristics of a planned or plan rational economy, has allowed it to 
achieve more success in pollution control than the United States.
The American combination of an intensely decentralized system with a 
market-oriented democracy has often resulted in policies that have been so 
debated and compromised that their original intent is diluted and often rendered 
ineffective. To simply acquire information from the private sector, much less
150 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 1925- 
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force private producers to modify their processes, the U.S. government must 
intrude in a way that runs counter to strong traditions of private property and a 
market economy in the U.S., where business and industry is not under the 
purview of government. In the U.S. the private sector is an independent entity 
with one goal - to increase profits. However, as the United States is also a very 
pluralistic society which includes many interest groups, the desires of both the 
executive and legislative branches must contend with the desires of 
environmental pressure groups and other special interest groups to regulate 
industry’s actions regarding the environment. Thus, industry and 
environmentalists ally themselves with various government authorities or 
agencies to battle over regulatory standards. The constant conflict between free 
market philosophy and environmental regulation serves to compromise the 
policy-making process, resulting in a weakly implemented environmental policy 
and the highest rate of appeals, postponement and litigation in the world where 
environmental regulation is concerned.151 The effects of successfully lobbying 
against initial legislation were illustrated during the U.S. auto industry’s 
campaign against The Clean Air Act's regulations.
Administrative Agencies and Environmental Policy
In the U.S. system, the private sector maintains a great deal of autonomy, 
and the public sector consists of separated branches with separated powers. In 
this fragmented system the bureaucracy has limited influence, and thus limited 
ability to implement its goals. When comparing separate approaches to 
environmental policy in the U.S. and Japan, it is important to realize that 
Japan's bureaucracy has traditionally dominated the legislative process in 
Japan, due to its central role in developing Japans economy following both the
151 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.27.
53
Meiji restoration and, more specifically, W W II. Japan's administrative agencies 
maintain a great deal of economic and political power and Japan's private 
sector continues to be guided by these strong bureaucratic agencies. 
Furthermore, Japan’s administrative agencies attract the highest ranking 
graduates of the best Universities in Japan, and the positions of top officials in 
the Ministries have traditionally been the most prestigious in the Japanese 
society.152 Chalmers Johnson states that, “the elite bureaucracy of Japan 
makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national 
budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the system.”153 
Conversely, American policy decisions are principally made in Congress, which 
also controls the budget. Furthermore, U.S. bureaucratic agencies tend to have 
their own individual interests, thereby exacerbating the existing fragmentation of 
power.
The success of Japan's pollution abatement policies can be largely 
credited to the strength of both the Japanese business-government coalition, as 
well as the strength of Japan’s administrative agencies. The bureaucracy’s 
traditional monopoly over the legislative process, and the consequential lack of 
success of opposition sponsored bills regarding environmental policy support 
this thesis. The Japanese bureaucracy’s power is further reinforced by the fact 
that it not only drafts legislation, but it is also the principal interpreter of 
legislation.154
Conversely, in the United States, Congress basically interacts with the 
administrative agency by saying, “here is the problem-deal with it.”155 
Furthermore, the U.S. administrative agency, the EPA, does not have the 
authority or the funds that it needs to coerce industry into achieving the set
152 Johnson, p.20.
153 Johnson, p.21.
154 Fujikura et. al., p.233.
155 Buchholz et. al., p.81.
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regulatory standards. This stands in stark contrast to MITI and The Environment 
Agency in Japan, both of which have considerably more means of promoting 
industry's compliance for pollution standards than does the EPA. National 
policy-making in Japan is almost entirely dominated by a strong and capable 
bureaucracy interested in increasing technology and efficiency in the constant 
pursuit of economic growth.
The Business Lobby in the United States
In the United States, there are no set goals or rules concerning 
environmental policy making and its implementation. Those with large 
resources, such as industry, have always been better represented by interest 
groups, and the least wealthy have typically failed to organize.156 
Consequently, the rise of interest groups and decline of political parties over the 
past three decades has drastically aggravated the U.S. policy making process. 
George Stiglers's “capture theory” of regulation assumes self interested 
behavior by both politicians and their constituents. Under this view, 
representatives and political parties seek electoral success as well as the 
power and perks of political office. They do not act on behalf of their own views 
or values concerning policy; they, in effect, sell political power to any group that 
purchases policies with votes and resources. Therefore a group’s ability to offer 
the requisite payment is the basis of an effective political demand.157
Similar to the capture theory, the “Electoral Theory of Congress”, 
developed by David Mayhew and Morris Fiorina, is based on the premise that 
members of Congress seek only reelection. In regard to legislation, the theory 
suggests, members of Congress earn electoral rewards mainly by servicing
156 Jeffrey Berry, The Interest Group Society. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1984) p.3.
157 Paul Quirk, Bevond Self Interest. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 184.
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organized interest groups and seeking benefits for their constituents. These 
activities give benefits to groups that are capable of recognizing their 
representatives effort, and rewarding them with some form of support. 
Consequently, members of Congress gain little support by trying to advance 
broad interests or to implement an ideology.158 In short, Congress has an 
exceedingly limited capacity to serve the broad or diffuse interests of the nation 
as a whole. Instead its main desire is to distribute particularized benefits to 
specific localities and organized groups.159
Administrative agencies also have incentives to adopt certain policy 
preferences. Some agencies have independent ties with particular business 
sectors, interest groups and/or Congressional committees.160 These 
independent forces generate intense activity aimed at influencing the 
bureaucracy’s decisions and actions. According to Paul Quirk, one of the most 
common and serious criticisms of administrative agencies is that which accuses 
regulatory agencies, "of persistently serving the interests of regulated industries 
to the neglect or harm of more general, or ’public,' interests."161 Such behavior 
is variously referred to as "clientelism," "agency capture," or "producer (or 
industry) protection."162 Regardless of the name, the accusation implies 
excessive industry influence on regulatory agencies.163 As regulations often 
have major effects on the interests and practices of regulated industries, 
industry perceives that its overall financial position can be significantly affected 
by regulatory agency decisions, in response it can generate intense activity 
aimed at influencing them.
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Aside from lobbying, and the financial advantage that industry maintains 
in lobbying efforts, there are many ways that the private sector can generate 
influence of a regulatory agency. In some cases the information on which 
agency decisions are based is often obtained mainly from the regulated 
industries themselves. This is sometimes due to the failure of non-industry 
groups to participate in the policy making process, or from the fact that only 
industry has the information needed for the decision.164 It is also suggested that 
under certain political administrations industry can influence the bureaucratic 
appointment process, in this case appointees tend to favor the interests of 
industry.165 Additionally, regulated industries and firms may be able to reward 
or punish regulatory agencies through their access to higher political 
authorities. Another explanation for the "capture" of an agency by industry has 
to do with the career patterns of regulatory officials; specifically those who 
leave their agencies and go to work for regulated industries.166 Finally, 
although Quirk questions its frequency, there remains the matter of corruption 
and of practices that border on corruption. Bribes, legitimate business 
opportunities, speaking engagements, trips, gifts, all may at times be offered to 
regulatory officials with the intention of influencing them.167 As regulatory 
legislation tends to permit the administering agency some discretion, through
the use of vague statutory standards as "the public interest, or, as deemed
necessary," regulatory agencies are able to, and often do, protect industry 
interests.
Clearly, the most vigorous opposition to environmental objectives in the 
United States comes from the business community. In legislative,
164 Quirk, Industry Influence, p. 17.
165 Quirk, Industry Influence, p. 17.
166 Quirk. Industry Influence, p. 19.
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administrative, and judicial action, in the mass media, in public relations 
campaigns, in scientific and technical claims and data, its resistance to 
ecological concerns and environmental regulations is great. Each form of 
business, be it raw material production, manufacturing, commerce, 
transportation, or construction, has its own particular objection to environmental 
proposals, and almost all business groups find common reasons to produce a 
shared objection to pollution regulations.
While citizen movements have certainly played, and still do play, a role in 
the structuring of environmental policies, they have seldom shaped 
environmental policy directly.168 That shaping takes place largely through the 
interaction of administrators and large well organized national interest groups 
representing either environmental causes or industrial interests. In this process 
the private sector typically proves to be the most influential. The U.S. Congress, 
Executive branch, and the EPA are all strongly influenced by powerful business 
lobbies that continually resist government regulations, such as air pollution 
polices.
The Council On Competitiveness
The business lobby has not only had a great deal of control over the 
actions of Congress and administrative agencies, but it increased its power vis 
a vis Congress and the bureaucracy during the presidential administrations of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush. The Task Force on Regulatory Relief was 
created under Ronald Reagan’s presidency in an effort to cut federal 
regulations of business. In a 1981 speech President Reagan stated, “American 
Society experienced a virtual explosion in government regulation in the 1970’s. 
Excessive and inefficient regulations limit job opportunities, raise prices and
168 Buchholz et al., p.81.
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reduce the incomes of all Americans ”169 President Reagan proudly claimed 
that after the first year of the task force’s operation his administration had, “acted 
quickly and effectively to cut away the thicket of federal regulations... a thicket 
that was stifling business and industrial growth.”170 The task force was 
extremely effective in cutting the costs and effectiveness of EPA regulations.
In a concurring speech in 1981 Vice-President Bush similarly declared 
that “we have regulated ourselves to death.”171 On March 31, 1989 President 
Bush issued an executive order creating the Council On Competitiveness. The 
Council served to review issues that dealt with the competitiveness of the U.S. 
in the international market, including regulatory relief. The Council On 
Competitiveness was headed by Vice President Quayle. Quayle’s actions and 
intentions as head of The Council aroused a great deal of concern from the 
Council’s critics, as Quayle’s preemptive power as head of The Council was so 
strong that he was frequently able to overrule the heads of federal agencies 
such as the EPA.
Representative Henry Waxman (Democrat-California), a principal author 
of The Clean Air Act, charged that The Council was systematically attempting to 
undermine the implementation of the Clean Air Act’s mandates. The 
Competitiveness Council suggested more than a hundred changes to the Clean 
Air Act of 1990. The most controversial was a proposed amendment that would 
allow companies to set their own pollution levels.172 Waxman claimed that this 
provision would basically negate the Clean Air Act by allowing a polluter to 
increase emissions without limit if a state did not object within seven days. 
Changes were also made by The Council on pollution permits, allowing
169 “The Regulators Ride Again,” The New York Times, April 28,1991, p.5.
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171 "The Regulators Ride Again," p.5.
172 Christopher Thanner, “The Role of Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness in the Federal 
Regulatory Process”, An unpublished paper presented to Dr. William Morrow, 12-12-91.
59
industries to increase their emissions under the claim of “emergency 
circumstances.” The Competitiveness Council could effectively get away with 
many of its deregulatory attempts, as it maintained that it was part of the White 
House and, consequently, its communications and actions were part of the 
Executive decision making process and not subject to Congressional 
oversight.173 Therefore, from 1981 (following the automobile industry’s last 
compliance deadline) to 1992 the Regulatory Relief Task Force and the Council 
on Competitiveness acted solely to minimize the effects of federal regulations 
on the private sector. The Council successfully rewrote regulatory law, and 
acted in opposition to Congress’s legislative mandate as well as the EPA’s 
public mandate to pass and implement environmental legislation.
The Media and Environmental Policy
Interest group lobbying is also directed at influencing any government 
institution or official indirectly by attempting to sway public opinion, with the 
intent of influencing the action of an institution of official. Thus, the business 
lobby in the U.S. goes beyond the political system to acquire public support as 
well. In the public policy arena, the private sector has to promote free enterprise 
and overshadow those forces that would serve to paint a negative picture of free 
enterprise. In this new activism of business lobbies, advocacy-issue advertising 
has become an effective public relations vehicle for business. Companies are 
attempting to make themselves heard and seen in a positive light on a broad 
range of social, economic, environmental, and other legislative issues.174 
Sethi points out,
173 “Competitiveness Council Under Scrutiny” The Washington Post, November 26, 1991, 
p.A19.
174 S. Prakash Sethi, Handbook of Advocacy Advertising: Concepts. Strategies, and 
Applications. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987) p. 10.
60
This important communication tool will influence not only the activities 
of its sponsors- -notably the private corporate sector- -but also the 
nature of public policy debate. One has only to look at the onslaught of 
political commercials during an election campaign to appreciate how 
they have irrevocably changed the character of the electoral process, 
and indeed the political process, in the United States.175
Over the past three decades there has been a tremendous increase in 
the effectiveness and growth of advocacy advertising in the United States. In a 
nationwide survey of public attitudes regarding this promotional advertising, 60 
percent of the respondents endorsed the concept of corporate advocacy 
advertising, even though 64 percent acknowledged that companies using such 
advertising might have an unfair advantage over public interest groups, as they 
would have less money to spend for such advertisements.176 57 percent of 
those who said they had been aware of issue advertising reported that the ads 
had caused them to change their minds about an issue.177 What they learned 
from the ads prompted 84 percent of respondents to vote for or against a 
candidate; 40 percent to attempt to change someone else’s mind about an 
issue; and 25 percent to write to public officials.178
According to these percentages advocacy advertising is an effective tool 
for business. Consequently, the private sector has used advocacy advertising 
for a multitude of reasons; to clear a tarnished public image, to oppose 
regulatory policy, to sell an idea, to support a political candidate sympathetic to 
private sector interests, or to promote itself as environmentally responsible. As 
noted in the automobile industry’s case study, Chrysler Corporation utilized the 
power of advocacy advertising against the Clean Air Act in the 1970’s.
Although this tool is available to other groups as well, they typically do not have
175 Sethi, p. 4.
176 Sethi, p. 16.
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the funds or resources necessary to utilize the mass media as readily and 
effectively as big business. This phenomena of advocacy advertising has 
recently occurred in other countries, particularly Canada, Great Britain, and 
Western Europe, but has not reached such a degree in Japan.179
Culture and Cooperation
It is clear at this point in the study that two different political approaches to 
environmental policy exist within the U.S. and Japan. The political structures * 
themselves have partially evolved as a result of separate cultures and histories. 
The plurality of the U.S and the strong bureaucratic system of Japan serve as 
examples of such political traditions and cultures.
In Japan the implementation of government industrial policy is facilitated 
by a credit-based industrial finance system, which allocates resources through 
state influence and administrative policies.180 The central concern of the 
Japanese state, specifically following W W II, has been economic development. 
From the beginning of the post W WII era, the Japanese bureaucracy had a 
strong commitment to moving labor out of low productivity sectors into high 
wage industries, specifically moving labor out of agriculture and into industry.
The industrial structure built in Japan since 1945 has, to a large degree, been 
due to the deliberate restructuring promoted by Japan’s bureaucratic agencies. 
The bureaucracy channeled resources into those industries for which there was 
a growing domestic demand and potential economic growth. Thus, policy for 
industrial development in Japan was historically formulated within a triangle of 
government bureaucrats, major companies, and banks. In this process the 
centralized bureaucracy was, and remains, somewhat insulated from
179 T.J. Pempel, ed., Policy Making in Contemporary Japan. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
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parliamentary and public pressure and has "been manned by a mandarine elite 
that stands first among equals."181
In combination with historical factors Japan’s eastern culture offers a very 
different platform for industrial regulation when compared to the U.S.'s free and 
open western society.182 Shuji Hayashi writes, "All behavior- -greetings, table 
manners, sleeping habits; how people ride an escalator, run a meeting, or 
reach a consensus- -is part of culture. These forms of behavior are transmitted 
from generation to generation."183 In the Japanese culture there is a tradition of 
submissiveness to authority, possibly making Japan a more fertile ground for 
policy implementation and adherence. Additionally, in Japan, management 
emphasizes completion of a task and attainment of objectives, where the 
predominant pattern in all organizations is teamwork.184 Hayashi claims that 
the Japanese feel very uncomfortable about leaving a task only ninety percent 
completed.185
The U.S. does not have this similar historical or cultural backdrop to draw 
from. As previously stated, the U.S. political system is relatively weak when 
compared to other industrialized countries. The founding fathers specifically 
intended to construct a system designed to restrain power. In addition, in this 
relatively weak system of separated powers, private groups are able to 
penetrate the political process quite easily, consequently effecting policy 
making and policy outcomes. Furthermore, America's financial system is also 
decentralized, leaving the government with few economic controls by which to 
influence industry. Thus, due to cultural and historical reasons, Japan is better 
able to achieve a strong and consistent environmental regulatory policy, while
181 Zysman, p.235.
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the U.S. system and culture tends to encourage deliberation and deadlock at 
the expense of action.
Summary
It is apparent that in some policy areas, governments distinguish 
themselves from one another more by their policy implementation methods than 
by their choice of policy content.186 As examined throughout this paper, over 
the past twenty-five years the United States and Japan have adopted similar 
environmental regulations, specifically air pollution standards as seen in this 
study. The national governments of both the United States and Japan have set 
comparable emission regulations for similar types of atmospheric pollutants. 
However, when it comes to implementing this legislation, each government 
approaches industry compliance by contrasting means. In the simplest sense, 
what separates these approaches from one another is the balance they adopt 
between enforcement through a concerted industry-government effort, as seen 
in Japan, or enforcement in a fragmented arena consisting of conflicting views 
and competing power forces, as in the United States.
The frequent confrontations occurring in this system are not only 
confrontations between opposing sides, industry versus environmentalists, but 
rather, confrontations pitting each of these groups against various governmental 
authorities.187 Environmentalists constantly sue the regulatory agencies to 
secure stricter environmental regulations, while business groups sue to relax 
these regulations.188 The eventual results of these adversarial relationships 
upon pollution policy has been lengthy litigation, lenient regulations with far 
reaching schedules, and few punishments for noncompliance. Conversely, in 
Japan regulatory policy is typically the product of an alliance between national
186 Adams et. al., p.344.
187 Adams et. al., p.324.
188 Adams et. al., p.324.
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government Ministries and business associations. Through this intricate 
network between institutions, industry interests are incorporated into the policy 
making process and, in turn, administrative agencies encourage businesses to 
cooperate with the decided regulatory standards. Fujikura et. al. state,
Of course, industry has at times fiercely remonstrated against 
governmental policies that it deemed scientifically unsound or 
economically onerous. Yet basically the interchange has been in spirit 
a partnership. Indeed, this cooperative pattern is also evident within 
and between industries, despite keen economic competition.189
A more unified system, such as produced by Japan's tight network of 
business and government, obviously has an advantage in imposing and 
overseeing environmental regulations. Fujikura et. al. state that, “One of the 
most striking aspects of the Japanese administration’s approach to enforcement 
surely must be the apparent reliance on negotiation and guidance.”190 In the 
alternate U.S. example, Tom Eagle of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency states that, “Everything is a battle to get things done at the EPA; a battle 
with industry, with the present administration, with Congress, with a deluge of 
opposing interests on every side.”191 The previous case study of the 
automobile industry illustrates the constantly competing forces in the U.S, and 
the effects of this intensely plural and fragmented system. The case study also 
illustrates the positive results of Japan’s government and industry working 
together in Japan; results exemplified through the NOx study group, 
administrative research and development teams, and government research 
funding and tax incentives.
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C O N C L U S I O N
Following World W ar II Japan based its re-vamped state on the American 
model of a market based constitutional democracy.192 Over the past twenty-five 
years the United States and Japan have also adopted similar environmental 
policies. However, Japan has achieved an impressive level of environmental 
clean-up while the U.S., in comparative terms, has not. Environmental 
regulations have not been implemented as successfully in the United States as 
they have in Japan. The successful implementation of environmental 
regulations in Japan is due primarily to the bureaucracy's ability to control the 
formulation of pollution laws and cooperate with industry in their 
implementation. Conversely, the implementation of environmental regulations 
in the U.S. is characterized by an adversarial relationship between business 
and government, within a state that lacks strong institutional powers.
Salem Katsh et. al. describe the business-government relationship in the
U.S.:
An adversarial framework has traditionally governed relations between 
public and private sectors in the United States. Rooted in the basic 
Jeffersonian ideals, which are suspicious of both 'big business and big 
government,' this framework has evolved into a complex of laws and 
regulations designed to maintain the independence of, and distance 
between, American industry and government officials so that each 
sector can serve as a check on the discretionary power of the other.193
Additionally, the U.S. government maintains little command of material
192 Samuels, p.9.
193 Salem Katsh, Ira Millstein, The Limits of Corporate Power. (New York: Macmillan, 1981) p.3.
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resources, such as the control of credit, that can be used to offer incentives to 
industry.194 Furthermore, the U.S. government plays a marginal role in the 
allocation of capital and has relatively little public ownership.195 In this situation 
there is little cooperation between industry and government in the U.S. 
concerning industrial policy. Environmental policy, in particular, has been 
associated with an increase in political conflict between industry and 
government; thereby making an already adversarial relationship even more 
contentious.196
This adversarial relationship takes place in a highly visible, very 
accessible and fragmented political arena. The legislative process in the 
United States is extremely pluralistic. Set regulations are based on collected 
evidence presented by contending sides and interpreted according to specific 
procedures that are open to appeals and challenges at all stages, and in all 
arenas. Policy-making in the United States is typically long and contentious, 
and often ends in litigation. In terms of environmental policies this process 
produces the highest rates of appeals, postponement and litigation in the world, 
which of course serves to impede environmental policy and its 
implementation.197 It is interesting to note that in response to the stricter 
environmental standards since the 1970's, American businesses have hired 
more lawyers while Japanese businesses have hired more engineers.198
In contrast, given the close connections linking Japanese government 
and business, the Japanese regulatory process is directed through 
government-industry cooperation. Most industrial policy decisions in Japan are 
based upon negotiation, discussion and consultation. Fujikura et. al. state that,
194 Krasner, p.61.
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"by permitting industry to contribute to identifying and implementing its own 
solutions to a problem, administrative guidance contributes significantly to the 
effectiveness and fairness of the administrative process."199 The three forces 
that have typically served to unify Japan's policy making process are the 
leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, the leaders of business, and the elite 
bureaucrats. Upham states of this relationship,
The locus of political power was, and remains today, in the constant 
formal and informal consultations among these forces and in the strong 
personal, political, and economic relationships binding the 
representatives of these groups to one another.200
Formal and informal consultation is facilitated by a practice of elite recruitment 
from Tokyo University in both the public and private sectors 201 Additionally, 
advisory councils and policy clubs bring together officials, politicians, and 
industrialists on a regular basis.202 To further this strong business-government 
relationship business-oriented ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, retire their top bureaucrats at a 
relatively early age, who then often serve as board members for large 
companies 203 In these executive positions former Vice-Ministers maintain 
close relations with their former ministry subordinates who have often moved 
into the vacated government post204 Within this intricate network industry's 
interests are incorporated into the policy-making process and, in turn, top 
administrative agencies encourage businesses to cooperate with set regulatory 
standards. Thus, negotiation and compact are at the core of business-state
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relations in Japan.205
The success of Japan's regulatory policies can be further attributed to the 
bureaucracy’s ability to control the formulation of pollution laws and direct their 
implementation in a concerted effort with various ministries, such as MITI and 
the Environment Agency, as well as private sector firms. The strength of 
Japan's bureaucracy is so sound that even the Liberal Democratic Party's 
recent loss of power is believed to have little if any effect over the bureaucracy's 
objectives. Karel Van Wolferen, a specialist in Japanese politics, believes that 
the crumbling Liberal Democratic Party will not result in politicians wresting 
control from the bureaucrats, for given the intricate business-bureaucratic 
power, this is hardly possible 206 In fact, Van Wolferen argues that, "an 
obstructionist press and political coalitions wrecked by internal strife could 
further weaken Japan's politicians and further consolidate bureaucratic and 
business-bureaucratic power.”207
Japan's centralized business community is also linked to the state 
through the Keiretsu system. Inter-firm trade in Japan is dominated by long­
standing networks of reciprocal ties among companies, or groups of firms, 
formally identified as Keiretsu.208 Within the Keiretsu, trade, finance, and 
corporate control become closely linked 209 Furthermore, the Keidanren, a 
membership of more than 100 industry-wide associations, adjusts and mediates 
differences of opinion among its various member industries and businesses, 
and submits recommendations to the government regarding industrial policy.210
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Thus, the cooperative effort between government and business, and the lack of 
fragmentation in the private sector, results in cohesion and centralization. This 
stands in stark contrast to the constant conflict between various institutions, 
business, and interest groups that typifies U.S. government-business relations.
Additionally, the Japanese government provides a great deal of financial 
incentives to promote industry compliance with regulations. If too many 
industries are concentrated in one area, the central government subsidizes both 
the municipal government and the factory for relocation costs.211 The Japanese 
government may also construct an industrial site for the company, or subsidize 
the cost212 As stated earlier, the government additionally provides tax 
incentives and special loans to help businesses comply with regulation codes. 
There also exists in Japan the Environmental Pollution Control Service 
Corporation, a government owned and operated entity 213 It was established by 
the government to effectively control pollution without inhibiting economic 
growth. Among its many purposes the Environmental Pollution Control Service 
Corporation selects environmentally approved sites for industry, reserves or 
builds protected areas, and installs pollution control and abatement 
equipment214 On a smaller scale, Japanese administrative agencies have 
research groups within their agencies to assist the private sector with 
development. The U.S. government does not provide similar services for its 
industries, nor does it typically give financial incentives to the private sector to 
encourage regulatory compliance.
The central feature of American politics is the fragmentation and 
dispersion of power and authority. Federalism, the separation of powers 
doctrine, judicial review, the absence of a strong party system, a bicameral
211 Fujikura et. al., p.259.
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Congress, an independent judiciary, and a plethora of interest groups all serve 
to exasperate a state system in which power is separated by design. According 
to Stephen Krasner, "in comparison with their counter-parts in other industrial 
countries, U.S. central decision makers have difficulty extracting the domestic 
resources that they need to implement state policies."215
The U.S. bureaucracy, unlike Japan's bureaucracy, is relatively weak. In 
comparison with the advanced industrial countries, the U.S. bureaucracy has 
great difficulty in formulating and implementing its goals 216 Furthermore, the 
U.S. bureaucracy is open to direct infiltration by groups concerned with specific 
agency decisions. Thus, the bureaucracy's fragmentation and lack of power 
hinders the effective implementation of policy. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, although a strong U.S. administrative 
agency, does not maintain the legislative or implementary power that the 
Japanese Ministries, such as MITI or the Environment Agency hold. As stated 
throughout this paper, in Japan the implementation of emission and ambient 
standards and the attainment of many other policy objectives depends primarily 
on administrative enforcement217 Conversely, policy decisions in the U.S. are 
made by Congress. Consequently, the EPA does not maintain enough 
legislative power to effectively implement or enforce their environmental 
regulations.
Krasner contends that the weakest kind of state is one which is 
completely permeated by pressure groups and, of all the industrialized 
democracies, the U.S. is probably the closest to this pole of weakness.218 This 
state of affairs exists because the United States’ political system is open to 
various interests at all levels. Additionally, the American Constitution checks
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government's powers by limiting legal authority in all arenas, dividing power 
within the government, and dividing power among groups in society.219 
Because institutional powers are separated between the different branches of 
government, this system offers little centralized power and leaves few tools with 
which to implement policy.
Alternately, Japan is reputed to be among the strongest and most 
centralized states in the industrial world 220 These distinctly different
•V
characteristics of both the U.S. and Japan are integral aspects of each state's 
history. Each nation's approach to the regulation of industry needs to be 
understood within the political and historical context in which it evolved.
As Krasner contends, American society was born modern; it was not 
necessary to have a strong state to destroy a traditional society or an 
aristocracy 221 America was also an early industrializer; economic change took 
place slowly and with relatively little state direction 222 Even through the 1930's, 
the U.S. federal government played little direct role in the development of the 
nation’s industry's. Compared with other capitalist nations, America's steel, 
electric, textile, automobile, and chemical industries grew with relatively little 
direct government assistance.223 Hence, the U.S. government's weak role in 
industrial affairs is largely a consequence of the political history of America's 
industrialization.
Although Japan's vision of a post-war Democratic state was almost 
entirely based on the American model, Japan developed its own form of 
democracy that reflected the particular history and politics of Japan 224
219 Krasner, p.62.
220 Samuels, p.9.
221 Krasner, p.62.
222 Krasner, p.62.
223 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
224 Frank Upham, "Unplaced Persons and Movements," in Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan 
As History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) p.346.
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Japan's history led to cooperation between business and government.
Following W W II the extensive involvement of government in industrial 
development was decisive in saving the country from economic and political
i
dependence upon the industrial West and in creating conditions for Japan’s 
economic success.225 The legitimacy of this relationship has its historical roots 
in the Miji Restoration of 1868, in which economic development was similarly 
the state's central goal. The existence and development of this model of 
cooperation is not very well understood by Americans. Kahan et. al. state, "Too 
few Americans really understand the closely interwoven monolith that rules 
Japan. This is not the phantom 'Japan Inc. , ' . .  . The actual monolith is part and 
parcel of Japan’s traditional - that is prewar - ruling elite."226
As a result of these different relationships between business and 
government in Japan and the U.S., the implementation of similar environmental 
policies takes on distinctly different forms and results in both countries.
Although the U.S. has experienced sound improvements in environmental 
quality, Japan has achieved much higher levels of improvement in 
environmental quality. Due to the cooperative efforts of industry and 
government, Japan is better able to implement its environmental regulations 
than the United States. Conversely, stringent environmental regulations have 
been established in the U.S., yet many of these standards have never been 
met. The most vigorous opposition to environmental objectives in the United 
States comes from the business community. In legislative, administrative, and 
judicial action, in the mass media, in public relations campaigns, in scientific 
and technical claims and data, the private sectors resistance to environmental 
regulations is great. Each form of business, be it raw material production,
226 Boyd., p.85.
226 M. Kahan, F.W. Richmond, How To Beat The Japanese At Their Own Game. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983) p.26.
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manufacturing, commerce, transportation, or construction, has its own particular 
objection to environmental regulations. Due to the open nature of the U.S. 
system, and the absence of cooperation between business and the state, U.S. 
businesses can effectively lobby and litigate environmental regulations to 
death.
A pluralistic political system in which legislation is so negotiated, 
compromised, and diluted by various interests is a central factor in the often 
self-regulatory practices of business in the United States. This situation allows 
the private sector in the U.S. to effectively evade stringent environmental 
standards. Consequently, it becomes apparent why the Clean Air Act was so 
drastically weakened. The irony of this situation is that there is a much stronger 
environmental movement in the U.S. than in Japan. A 1990 Gallup poll showed 
that 76% of American's consider themselves environmentalists.227 However, 
because of its historically cooperative state-business relationship, Japan has 
been able to formulate and implement rigorous environmental regulations and 
achieve a level of environmental cleanup that is superior to the United States.
Recommendations
J a p a n
The Japanese government obviously has the ability to pass strong 
regulatory policy as well as the ability to achieve private sector compliance.
The existence of organization and cooperation between business and the 
bureaucracy is at the root of Japan's regulatory success. In short, the Japanese 
state is essentially capable of making decisions and of enforcing them once 
these decisions are made.228 This capability is clearly seen in Japan's success
227 Christopher Bosso, "Adaptation and Change in the Environmental Movement," in Allan Cigler 
and Burdett Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1991) p. 156.
228 Pempel, p. 16.
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with its Clean Air Act and with pollution abatement in general.
Unfortunately, unless people are dropping dead in the street from 
pollution, environmental policy remains a value question; what aspects of the 
physical environment are important, and why? The question becomes, does 
the physical environment, as well as plant and animal species, have an intrinsic 
value in and of themselves? Japan does not always seem to think so. Japan 
has the capability of enforcing strong environmental policies, yet apart from 
pollution abatement the Japanese government and society choose to limit their 
environmental policy making. In the areas of environmental protection, the 
preservation of scenic or rare environments, and the protection of endangered 
plant and animal species, Japan’s environmental record is weak if not 
controversial. The continued debate over commercial whaling is a primary 
example of this fact. Whaling is considered by most developed countries to be 
cruel, unnecessary, and ecologically threatening, yet Japan’s whaling industry 
remains in existence, and Japan continually fights for international access to 
this trade. To the present day Japan is attempting to revoke the international 
ban on commercial whaling of the Minke whale, even though this species has 
only recently been removed from international endangered species lists. The 
U.S. on the other hand has opposed commercial whaling for over a decade, 
and continues to oppose this practice in other countries.
As stated in the opening of this paper, the 1977 Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development reviewed the environmental policies 
of Japan and their apparent success. The O ECD’s report was highly 
complimentary of Japan’s efforts towards, and great success with, pollution 
clean up. However, the concluding comments of the report addressed Japan’s 
need to consider environmental policy in a broader context. The report stated 
that although Japan had succeeded with pollution abatement, the policies
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ignored environmental “amenities” such as beauty, quietness, privacy, and 
other un-measurable elements such as these.229 Pollution problems can be 
defined: pollution levels can be measured and pollution sources can be 
identified. Alternately, amenities are difficult to measure or define quantitatively 
in order to designate levels of improvement. Japan’s environmental policies 
were and are specifically focused towards pollution abatement, this 
concentrated effort is significant in the success of this goal.
Japan seems to act only upon environmental issues that directly effect 
the health of its population or the efficiency of the Japanese society. This is the 
greatest disappointment concerning Japan’s environmental agenda. Japan 
has the capability and political power to affect significant environmental 
changes, to achieve pollution abatement as well as environmental and species 
preservation, yet for the most part both Japan’s citizens and the government 
choose to forgo a broad approach to environmental policy. Thus, in the case of 
Japan it is recommended that the application of pollution problems be extended 
to apply to a more comprehensive environmental agenda.
The U n ited  S tates
If the United States were to decide that it wished to reach the air quality 
emission standards and overall environmental success that Japan has 
achieved through its regulatory system it would have to learn from the practices 
of Japan’s policy implementations. Specifically, administrative agencies in the 
U.S should be allotted more regulatory power, interest group access should be 
restricted, and most importantly the U.S. public and private sectors must work 
together in an attempt to achieve environmental goals and regulatory 
compliance. More specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency, rather
229 Pempel, p.252.
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than Congress, would have to establish strict emission standards and 
compliance schedules through scientific and technical consultation. This would 
have to be done in absence of interest group recommendations, either business 
or environmental. Following the establishment of emission standards, the EPA 
would have to work with the private sector and the government to design an 
implementation program. This program would necessarily include financial 
incentives, such as loans, tax reductions for compliance, and government 
research and development funding. By increasing the EPA’s implementation 
and regulatory responsibility the regulatory process would be centralized, 
thereby allowing the EPA to practice its political mandate and eliminate the 
many cleavages used to bypass environmental policy and achieve private 
sector self regulation in the United States. Although these suggestions do not 
entail an entire overhaul of the U.S. political system, they would require limits to 
interest group access, increased bureaucratic responsibility and power, and 
most importantly a cooperative business-government effort focused upon 
achieving substantial private sector compliance to environmental regulations.
Furthermore, although environmental interest groups remain forceful, 
they are too fragmented and diverse and have too many contending forces, to 
successfully achieve their various goals. In fact there are many environmental 
interest groups that encompass identical platforms, yet compete with one 
another for funding and political access. Additionally, the ability of non-profit 
organizations to compete with wealthy private sector interests is very limited in 
such a plural political system. If a more united force existed for environmental 
issues, the presence of environmental groups would be more politically 
powerful. In short, environmental groups should combine efforts when possible 
and perhaps even merge organizations. In relation to this problem, Mancur 
Olsen states in the Rise and Fall of Nations, that when a nation such as the
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United States is so overrun with various interests and interests groups, they all 
pull any significant political effort apart. Consequently, no substantial policy can 
be created or implemented, the political system is stagnated, and the nation 
eventually faces decline.230 In this case greater restrictions on lobbying are in 
order. This mandate would curb private sector powers by limiting some 
avenues (perhaps financial) of political access, as well as encourage 
environmental groups into organizing a more united effort. Restrictions would 
not eliminate or obstruct public access to the policy making process, they would 
simply lend more organization to the political process, and perhaps give well 
organized environmental interest groups more legitimacy.
Most importantly, the United States public and private sectors must 
attempt to cooperate in order to achieve improved environmental conditions.
The United States environmental movement has remained popular since the 
1960’s. However, a united effort from the government and industry in terms of 
environmental policy has not been evident. As business-government 
cooperation is at the core of Japan's success with environmental policy, the 
U.S. must learn from their example. In order to achieve a cooperative 
relationship the U.S. government and industry must realize that environmental 
policies can be financially sound policies. The global market for 
environmentally friendly products is worth an estimated $200 billion dollars a 
year, and is growing tremendously 231 Which country wins the race to perfect 
and sell green technologies will depend to a large degree on who has the best 
engineering and marketing skills 232 But equally important may be the 
encouragement that companies get from their government. Governments can
230 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth. Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
231 Michael Lemonick, "The Big Green Payoff," Time, June 1,1992, p.62. .
232 Lemonick, p.62.
exert enormous influence over how aggressively businesses take the 
environment into account, using tough standards in connection with incentives 
and rewards. The U.S government has done a relatively poor job of 
encouraging business to innovate. Fortunately, some U.S. companies, such as 
3M Corporation (Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing) realized, without the 
government's help, that being environmentally conscious can also lead to 
growth. 3M has drastically reduced pollution and waste at its manufacturing 
plants, and despite the conventional wisdom that says environmentalism is a 
luxury, has steadily increased profits as a result of the company’s environmental 
efforts.233
“Once industrialists think about it seriously, they almost inevitably see the 
financial advantages of investments in environmental technology,” says Hugh 
Faulkner, executive director of the Business Council for Sustainable 
Development234 Yet, continues Faulkner, even with greater industrial 
environmental consciousness,
There could clearly be no prospect for sustainable development in 
either the developed or the developing world without government 
incentives. The nations that wield those carrots and sticks most 
skillfully will be the leaders of the new green revolution, and their 
industries will eventually be the ones to profit from it.235
This is a fact that Japan seems to have realized, but the United States has yet 
to accept. A report from the World Resources Institute says that the U.S. has 
fallen far behind in the effort to develop “green” technologies 236 The report 
also addresses the Japanese government’s long standing belief that “private 
firms benefit from assistance in endeavors of long-term strategic importance
233 Lemonick, p.62.
234 Lemonick, p.62.
235 Lemonick, p.62.
236 Lemonick, p.62.
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and that a future economic payoff will materialize from providing it.”237 The 
question is, with Japan and Western Europe continually striving for 
environmentally sound industries, what international position will the United 
States hold once these countries have increased their efficiency and growth to 
a point where the U.S. is no longer a supplier; no longer a competitor. Apart 
from the environmental implications, certainly the economic results are already 
apparent.
There are some recent signs that the United States government is 
initiating some cooperative efforts with business. Recently, the Clinton 
administration released a blueprint for reducing greenhouse gases, proposing 
ways for companies to gradually cut back on their levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The plan outlines more than 50 projects in which industry and 
federal agencies can cooperate in cutting emissions 238 The provisions call for 
such actions as suggesting that employers offer cash vouchers rather than 
subsidize parking with the intent of encouraging the use of public transportation. 
The problem with this cooperative effort is that most of the provisions rely on 
voluntary participation by private industry; very few provisions are actually 
mandatory. Furthermore, this plan involves little legislation and virtually no new 
spending 239 Therefore, there is very little incentive for industry to participate 
and no punishment if they choose not to. While Clinton’s effort to encourage 
government and business' efforts is on the right track, it cannot prove to be 
significantly effective if the effort lies solely on federal suggestions and voluntary 
compliance. Future environmental policy in the United States must consist of 
more than this. If the U.S. public and private sectors wish to cooperate towards 
environmental goals environmental policy must include stringent standards
237 Lemonick, p.62.
238 "Clinton Sets Plan to Cut Emissions," The New York Times, Oct. 18,1993, p. A1.
239 "Clinton Sets Plan to Cut Emissions," p.A1.
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accompanied by research and development aid and financial incentives 
designed to encourage companies to reach these standards.
Market Based Environmental Policy
Aside from imposing restrictions on lobbying, increasing the EPA's 
regulatory powers, or altering the U.S. constitutional order, there are few means 
by which the United States can follow Japan's example of efficient 
environmental policy making and its implementation. Japan has been more 
successful with environmental regulations due to the strength of its 
bureaucracy, the state’s economic powers, and historically strong business- 
government relations. There are many elements of Japan's success that cannot 
be transferred to the U.S. system such as historical business-government ties, 
inter-firm ties, and a government with a powerful bureaucracy that can direct the 
economy. Perhaps the U.S should not attempt to look towards Japan’s 
example, but instead explore alternatives to regulatory policy that would work 
with the U.S political-economic traditions instead of against them.
It is important to remember that U.S. industries are not paying the real 
cost of producing their goods, they instead expect the public and the 
government to absorb the cost of cleaning up their waste. If a company was 
expected to pay for its pollution, emissions would most likely be minimized. 
There are two recent suggestions from the economic community aimed at 
controlling pollution through the use of free market ideals. One approach is to 
tax pollution. For example, a tax per pound on a pollutant emitted could be 
imposed on power plants and other industries. A tax could even be imposed on 
automobile emissions based on each car’s expected emissions, further based 
on actual emission levels.240 The other approach that economists recommend
240 Steven E. Rhoads, The Economist's View of the World: Governments. Markets and Public
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is a tradable discharge license. The regulatory agencies could determine the 
total amount of emissions to be allowed in an area and then issue permits or 
licenses for these emissions. The permits would be bought and sold like 
industrial property by companies.241 If a firm would rather buy another 
company’s excess discharge license on a specific contaminant rather than 
install new equipment, this would be possible. This makes it financially sound 
for a firm to emit less pollutants in order to sell its excess license 242
Unfortunately, these recommended methods do not serve to reduce 
pollution as much as they serve to effectively control or enforce pollution. Yet, 
economists argue that past and current environmental legislation has been 
postponed, revised and evaded by the Congress, the courts, and the EPA.
While an effort to reduce pollution levels is optimally desired, controlling 
pollution is preferable to the current rise in pollution. These suggestions would 
serve to enforce existing legislation by making emissions costly to a firm.
Excess emissions would result either in higher taxes, or in tying up money in 
costly emissions permits. Their point should be well taken and seriously 
considered.
Both of these suggested market based mechanisms have an advantage 
over the existing regulatory system in their ability to rechannel self-interest so 
that it becomes congruent with environmental policy.243 Put simply, emissions 
would cost firms a great deal of money. As previously stated, emissions would 
result in either higher taxes or in tying up money in costly emissions permits. 
When economic incentives have changed, many firms will find it profitable to 
clean up their emissions rather than to delay cleaning up by fighting the EPA.244
Policy. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p.44.
241 Rhoads, p.44.
242 Rhoads, p.44.
243 Rhoads, p.45.
244 Rhoads, p.45.
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Additionally, these proposals would cut down on litigation. As it stands now if 
delay saves a company more than it loses in court costs, the company has an 
incentive to appeal at every stage, even if it thinks it will eventually lose.245 
Under the tax scheme a company would owe back taxes if it lost and there 
would also be less to litigate. Since the EPA would not be requiring each firm to 
meet a certain standard for emission or to install a particular technology by a 
particular date, the courts would not have to determine whether the EPA's rules 
for each firm were reasonable 246 Or, under the license suggestion, the court 
would find that the Congress has determined that it wants air or water of a given 
cleanliness. To get it requires limiting emissions to the level indicated by the 
emissions licenses. If a firm believes it must go to unreasonable and 
disproportionately great expense to clean up, the court can easily point out that 
the firm has the alternative of buying a marketable license from one of the firms 
with proportionately lower costs 247
These plans each propose achieving industrial compliance through and 
within the current market system using market incentives. This is particularly 
attractive considering the U.S. private and public sector's strong free market 
principles. Furthermore, these proposals require no changes in the current 
political system, they instead use the market based economic system. 
Additionally, under the current regulatory system once a firm is in compliance it 
has no incentive to still do better. With the incentive schemes the possibility of 
increasing profits by reducing pollutants remains, as long as any taxes are paid 
or capital is tied up in marketable effluent licenses.248 Thus, not only is 
compliance reached under the market incentive system, but innovations aimed 
at continually improving environmental quality and reducing emissions are
245 Rhoads, p.45.
246 Rhoads, p.45.
247 Rhoads, p.45.
248 Rhoads, p.47.
encouraged as well.
An alternative to environmental regulations is available through market 
based incentives for industrial compliance. By using free market incentives to 
entice industrial compliance, the present regulation system would be reformed 
and hopefully improved. As this study shows, the U.S. is not as well equipped 
to achieve environmental standards through regulation as Japan, perhaps for 
the United States free market environmentalism is a sound solution.
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